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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines tne proliferation of advanced air defense weapons
in certain Third World regions and the implications these transfers may have
on United States Naval forces operating in and around these waters. It
assesses the extent of proliferation, and examines the capability of selected
nations in regions where the U.S. Navy operates on a regular basis. It also
examines motives and trends behind the import and export of air defense
weapons and the implications proliferation will have on the four naval
missions, sea control, strategic sealift, power projection, and strategic
deterrence. Three options are put forth that address possible "adjustments" of
U.S. policy to counter the effect of air defense weapons proliferation. The
options considered are, the military response, controlling the threat through
arms control, and changing the national interest. Finally, the question--is the
U.S. willing to overcome the problems created by air defense weapons
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the end of World War 11 the majority of U.S. defense planning has
been oriented toward central Europe and the related Soviet threat. During
this time U.S. policy in the Third World has been one of containment of the
USSR in a political sense, while military confrontation has played a lesser
role. To leap containment and establish a presence, and gain influence in the
Third World, the USSR began transferring arms. Soviet arms transfers must
be singled out for emphasis in any study of Soviet policy in the Third World,
because they are the primary instrument used in their quest for influence in
developing countries [Ref. l:p. 170]. Initially the USSR, Western Europeans,
and the U.S. supplied second hand weapons or older, less capable type arms.
By the 1970s there were several significant shifts in arms export trends
throughout the world. One major shift was the significant increase in
volume of arms transferred, primarily to Third World nations. The second
major shift was in the quality of weapons transferred. Whereas the U.S. had
generally led in the export of advanced technology, the USSR during the late
1970s started to increase the sophistication of weapons exported. Another
shift was the increase in arms supplied by Western Europe and the emergence
of second-tier suppliers such as Israel, China, and Brazil. The final shift
concerned the dramatic increase in the number of recipients of arms, both old
and advanced weapons. [Ref 2:p. 31 The increase in recipients and suppliers
was due to a variety of political, military, and economic reasons.
Since the early 1980s world wide arms transfers have steadily declined
due to declining availability of cash, Third World debt, and the inability of
countries to absorb the large amounts of weapons already purchased. In an
overall assessment this seems to be a positive trend in the stability of the
international system. Yet, a more careful look may lead to a different
assessment of international stability. The amount of arms being transferred is
certainly declining, yet the quality and sophistication of arms being
transferred is increasing at an unprecedented rate. Nations are no longer
satisfied with second hand or obsolete equipment. Nations now require
advanced technology and weapons of mass destruction to be satisfied. From
F-15s, Mig-29s, and Mirage 2000 jets to the Improved Hawk and SA-13s, the
rate of advanced technology transfer is sobering.
Today, there is a new, ominous and increasing threat to world peace.
Gone are the "stable" days of the Cold War and its replacement is an
increasingly unstable Third World. These Third World countries have
shown a tendency to settle their disputes by force of arms, as Iraq has shown
in its current dispute with Kuwait. As these arms become more sophisticated
and as the world becomes more interdependent in nature there will be a
tendency for these conflicts to grow wider in scope, encompassing more
countries.
This paper addresses some aspects of this development. It will look at the
extent of air defense proliferation in the Third World, the countries that will
be suppliers in this "post" cold war multi-polar environment, and the impact
this increased ability will have on the four U.S. Navy missions. Given this
impact, policy options are put forth, and a final question is explored--is the
U.S. willing to overcome the problems created by proliferation in the Third
World?
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In order to best illustrate the effect increased air defense capabilities will
have on the United States and its Navy, this thesis is organized as follows.
Chapter I introduces a hypothetical Third World conflict scenario that
demonstrates the ability of many Third World nations to interfere with U.S.
Navy operations throughout the world. Chapter II briefly describes the
capabilities of air defense weapons, looks at the extent of their proliferation,
and addresses selected capability by region. Chapter III investigates the
motivation for acquiring air defense weapons, and the export trends of these
advanced weapons. It addresses who the major suppliers are, and the
emergence of second tier suppliers. Chapter IV addresses the implications air
defense weapons proliferation will have on the four U.S. Navy missions.
Chapter V identifies three poiicy options for planners to consider in order to
realistically approach the problems created by proliferation. Chapter VI
concludes with the question--is the U.S. willing to overcome the problems
created by air defense weapons proliferation in the Third Wurld? It is hoped
that the broad scope of this study will enhance the ability of planners to
address air defense weapons proliferation in the Third World, U.S. national
interests, and force structure requirements for Third World contingencies of
the future.
A. U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE NEW WORLD--A SCENARIO
On April 30, 1992 India invaded Pakistan. India justified the invasion on
the grounds that Pakistan was supplying Moslem rebels in Kashmir with
weapons, training, and money. Thus, by supplying these items, the Pakistani
government was interfering with Indian internal matters. Kashmir is the
only Indian state where Moslems outnumber Hindus. Pakistan and India
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have been fighting over Kashmir since the British withdrawal in 1947. The
Indians' claim that Pakistan has infringed upon their sovereignty and they
must be punished. Pakistan has a capable American-supplied military force,
but it is questionable as to how long they can hold out against the much larger
Indian forces without substantial American re-supply and/or intervention.
In order to protect American strategic interests with Pakistan, and to
maintain American prestige in the Moslem world and with other allies in the
region, the United States decides to continue arms shipments to Pakistan and
to replace losses. In response to the American position, the Indian
government hints at possible interdiction of the resupply. With numerous
options available to them, the Indian "threat" should be viewed very
seriously by American analysts.
Fears of a Pakistani victory with American support, that would increase
"western" influence around the region, prompt Iran into a temporary alliance
of convenience with India. Sensing U.S. indecision and vulneability in the
region, the Iranian government declares that the Straits of Hormuz are closed
to all "western" bound oil tankers. This event sends shock waves through
U.S. and allied stock markets, and the possibility of oil shortages exists.
After consulting with the National Security Council, the JCS, his
advisors, and the leaders of Congress, the President declares that the U.S. and
allied ships cannot be ordered about or excluded from any international
waters. To show resolve the President orders the Navy to escort any and all
applicable vessels and to conduct freedom of navigation operations where
applicable.
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By May 4, 1991 two carrier battle groups, Nimitz and Kennedy, are
steaming towards the Indian Ocean. These battle groups, augmented with
frigates and destroyers for escort duty, will provide air cover for aerial and
naval resupply of Pakistan and escort duty for merchants passing through the
Straits and g-ing to Karachi.
On May 7, 1991 the Indians declare a 50 NM exclusion zone off the coast of
Pakistan. This is accompanied by a warning that any attempt to penetrate the
zone or to provide airborne resupply will be met grave consequences. Later
in the day a U.S. Air Force C-141 is shot down. It is believed that an Indian
MIG-29 was responsible. The following morning an Air Force C-5 is turned
back by two Indian Mirage-2000s.
As of May 8, 1991 the two carrier groups are almost in position. The
Indian blockade seems fairly secure and the Iranians are wreaking havoc on
Persian Gulf traffic. The ground war is slowly turning against Pakistan and
resupply is imperative. A NATO meeting is called in Brussels to assess the
impending economic crisis and to discuss military options. The President is
again meeting with his advisors to decide U.S. options. The Soviet Union is
quietly sitting on the sidelines nursing its own economic and political
problems.
The scenario projects a future crisis in which Third World nations with
advanced air defense weapons capability can seriously effect the use of U.S.
Navy air power in certain regions of the world. Concern over ti'is type of
scenario already exists, surfacing in Lebanon, the protracted Iran-Iraq conflict,
and the current Iraq-Kuv;_iit conflict. I. Lebanon, two navy jets were shot
down and one severely damaged by Soviet SAMs, while in Iran the American
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made F-14s and I-HAWK SAMs were a serious deterrent to American forces
in the P.rsian Gulf.1 With today's arms transfer trends it is not only Soviet
equipment that deters, but also Western equipment, which may be even
more difficul'- to counter.
The forces central to this scenario are representative of the military
capabilities which have emerged as a result of the vast technology transfer of
the 1980s. Though the amount of arms transferred has declined since the
early 1 980s, the sophistication of the weapons has dramatically increased. The
air defense capability of the scenario participants is outlined below.
1. India
India has an impressive array of air-defense capabilities. The army
maintains 26 SA-6, 620 SA-7, 20 SA-8A/B, SA-9, and 25 British Tigercat
launchers. The Indian Navy sails two ex-British aircraft carriers, each capable
of carrying Sea Harrier strike/fighters. The navy has a total of 23 Sea I-,_ .ers.
The Indian Navy also has numerous Destroyers and Frigates with SA-N-1,
SA-N-4, and Seacat SAM systems. The Indian Air Force flies 22 fighter
squadrons. Of these 22 squadrons, 6 contain MIG-29s and Mirage-2000s (over
100 total aircraft) which are two of the most technologically advanced aircraft
around today. These 22 squadrons are armed with AA-2, AA-7, R-550 Magic,
1According to a recent study, Iranian F-14s and Hawk missiles posed a
significant threat to U.S. ships and aircraft operating in the Persian Gulf.
Tbough the status of this equipment was never certain, each of these systems
coiLd have destroyed American lives and equipment [Ref. 3:pp. 74-781.
Considering the USS Vincennes (CG 49) shot down an airliner thinking it
was a lone F-14 shows how much emphasis is placed on advanced air defense
capability by U.S. Navy operators.
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and Matra Super 530D Air to Air Missiles. The Indian Air Force also mans
SAM batteries consisting of SA-2 and SA-3s. [Ref. 4 :p.1 5 9 ]
2. Iran
While Iran's air defense weapons systems are not as extensive as
India's, the fact that many are Western made causes considerable problems
for American planners. The Iranian army maintains some 30 Improved
HAWKs, SA-7s, and Swedish RBS-70s. The Iranian Navy's air defense
weapons include three destroyers loaded with 4x2 SM-1 surface to air missiles.
Reports vary as to the number of serviceable aircraft in Iran's Air Force.
According to the most recent Military Balance, Iran maintains some 20 F-4
D/E, 20 F-5 E/F, and F-14s. Each of these aircraft can be fitted with one or
mote of the following Iranian missiles: AIM-54, AIM-9, or AIM-7. The
Iranian Air Force also has 5 sqn with 30 Rapier SAM, 25 Tigercat SAM
launchers, and 50 HQ-2J (Chinese version of SA-2) SAM systems. [Ref. 4:p.
1001
3. Pakistan
While the Pakistani air defense weapons would be no threat to U.S.
forces in the given scenario, to show the extent of weapons proliferation in
the region, the Pakistani forces will be listed. The Pakistani army possesses
100 Stingers, 144 RBS-70s, 6 batteries of Crotale, and the Anza SAM is reported
to be in service. The Pakistani Navy has 1 Destroyer, and 2 Frigates armed
with British Seacat SAMs, and 4 Frigates armed with SM-1 MR SAMs. The
Pakistani Air Force consists of 451 aircraft, including the Mirage III, Mirage 5,
Q-5, J-6/JJ-6, J-7s, and 40 F 16s. Many of these aircraft can be armed with their
supplies of AIM-7s, AIM-9s, and R-530s and the R-550 magic. [Ref. 4:p. 1691
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The scenario and selected inventories are presented in order to
demonstrate the ability of Third World nations with advanced technology to
interfere with U.S. Naval operations due to their ability to acquire and
produce these weaponE. The scenario presented is by no means an isolated
incident, and could happen in many regions of the World. According to the
recent Department of Defense study Discriminate Deterrence, the diffusion of
weapons and the technological developments in the Third Word require a
reorientation of U.S. strategy to increase emphasis on regional crisis [Ref. 5: p.
9]. The implications of advanced technology weapons proliferation has
moved to the forefront of military planners' thoughts. According to the 1990
Joint Military Net Assessment, "the national military objectives serve the
national security goal of preserving the U.S. and a free nation with its
fundamental institutions and values intact, while deterring war. One of
these national military objectives is to preclude military significant
technology transfer to potential adversaries." [Ref 6: p. ES-2]
The national objective of preventing technology transfer is almost
exclusively associated with ballistic missiles, and nuclear or chemical
weapons. The MTCR and the non-proliferation treaty are always at the fore
of technology transfer discussions, and when air defense weapons "legally" in
service or those being transferred to the Third World are discussed, interest
wanes substantially. Yet when one ponders future U.S. force reductions and
the current air defense capability already operational and in the pipeline,
these more probable threats from air defense weapons need to be addressed.
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IL THE EXTENT OF AIR DEFENSE WEAPONS PROLIFERATION
At a time when superpower cooperation is reaching new heights, arms
control fever is in the air, and defense budgets are being cut, thc proliferation
of advanced weapons is continuing unabated. This proliferation is not
limited to one isolated region in the world, but is a global problem that has
potential impact on current naval operations and naval missions. As air
defense weapons and advanced technology continue to be supplied there is a
growing internationalization of knowledge on how to operate and maintain
these weapons. This knowledge will also, though more slowly, enable more
nations to produce air defense weapons. The diffusion of capability and
knowledge will exacerbate Third World regional tensions and increase the
intensity of the conflicts that will ensue. U.S. Navy planners must recognize
the potential extent of this problem and the current capabilities that already
exist.
A. ADVANCED AIRCRAFT AND SURFACE TO AIR MISSILES
Since the end of World War II land and sea warfare have become
increasingly dominated by aircraft. With all things being equal, success on the
battle field or ocean now goes to the side that controls and uses airspace to
their best advantage. 2 Defense of this airspace is becoming increasingly
2The Israelis have learned this lesson well. During the 1967-70 war of
attrition, Israel lost only 22 aircraft to air defense. By the 1973 war Egypt had
updated its air defense systems, and the Israelis lost 40 aircraft in the first 48
hours. The message was clear and Israel was back on top during the 1982
Bekaa Valley air battle. (See Airpower Journal, Winter 1989, p. 60-61)
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important and difficult. With sophisticated equipment such as modern attack
aircraft, stealth, and stand off weapons, nations must be prepared to protect
their interests, assets, and sovereignty on the land and sea. 3
Defense of national airspace is fundamental to every nation's security. To
achieve effectiveness in defense of airspace, many Third World nations are
turning to state-of-the-art equipment, advanced surface to air missiles (SAMs)
and aircraft. Many Third World nations now have far more modern air
defense systems than some NATO countries [Ref. 7:p. 131. This is an
impressive realization considering what Argentina was able to do with a
relatively unsophisticated air force against a major western power! In today's
arms transfer environment there is a virtual smorgasbord of air defense
equipment for any Third World nation to choose from. This thesis is
concerned only with the most advanced types of these weapons. Aircraft to be
examined are fourth generation fighter/interceptors that have been exported;
F-15, F-16, F-18, Tornado, MIG-29, and Mirage 2000. SAMs considered are
those with production and operational dates of the late 1970s and beyond, and
have been exported: Crotale, Shahine, Roland, Javelin, Rapier, SA-13, SA-14,
I-HAWK, and Stinger. Certain caveats apply to the figures used to compile
the data in Figures 1 and 2, section B. Exact qualitative and quantitative data
on arms transfers are difficult to compile due to attrition, deliveries to be
3According to Norman Friedman writing in Proceedings (July 1990, p.
107), air attacks are probably the single greatest threat to U.S. Naval forces,
presented by Third World powers.
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made, and the updating of equipment. 4 The following Tables, I and II, list the
aircraft and SAM systems to be discussed and who the suppliers of these
systems are. Appendix A and B list the capabilities of each system.








* Source [Ref. 8]











* Source [Ref. 7] and [Ref. 9]
4Updates and improvements are constantly being made on most surface-











Figure 1. Proliferation of Advanced Aircraft-Arms Transfer Agreements
(compiled from SIPRI Yearbooks 1981-1990)
B. ASSESSMENT OF THE EXTENT OF PROLIFERATION
Ballistic missile proliferation is the object of much international attention
because it is viewed as aggressive or offensive, while the transfer of air
defense weapons is viewed differently. Air defense of a nation is a legitimate
right and the duty of every government. 5 Also, while ballistic missiles in the
50f course, "legitimate defense needs" is the cry of both suppliers and the








Figure 2. Proliferation of Surface-to-Air Missiles-Arms Transfer Agreements
(compiled from SIPRI Yearbooks 1981-1990)
Third World are typically older models, air defense weapons transfers have
recently become state-of-the-art transfers. These weapons are in the hands of
many Third World nations which the U.S. could certainly consider
adversaries in any number of scenarios. Nations such as Cuba, Libya, Syria,
Iraq, and North Korea all have advanced air defense capabilities in areas
where the U.S. Navy operates on a regular basis. Along with adversaries
there are many "al];es" within the Third World with these weapons. Of
aircraft have the capability to perform air-to-ground missions [Ref. 10:p. 1231.
The F-18 is the premier example of dual capability in air defense aircraft [Ref.
I1:pp. 395-397]. Even surface-to-air missiles can be considered offensive if the
country using them is invading another sovereign nation. Naval planners
currently in the Persian Gulf may not quite agree with the "legitimacy" of
Iraq's air defense weapons!
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course allies have a way of becoming adversaries as in the case of Vietnam,
Iran, and possibly Iraq's nineteenth province Kuwait. While there are huge
inventories of such older air defense weapons as the F-4/5, MIG-21/23, and
SA-2/3s, the weapons of concern in this study are state-of-the-art.
While advanced technology from the Soviet Union is a major concern
for U.S. planners, it is not the only one. Another major concern for the U.S.
is the fact that many of the air defense weapons transferred are from
"Western" nations. U.S. equipment has typically been developed with the
USSR in mind and has considerably less capability against other equipment
made in the West or the U.S. During the period 1980-1989 the major
exporters of advanced aircraft were the Soviet Union, the United States,
France, and Great Britain.6 As previously stated, advanced air defense aircraft
are defined as fourth generation aircraft with a fighter/interceptor capability,
and have been exported. The aircraft that fit these requirements, the Mirage
2000, MIG-29, Tornado, F-15, F-16, and F-18 are shown in Figure 1. As this
figure shows, the proliferation of these aircraft throughout the 1980s has been
explosive. In 1980 only 3 Third World nations had signed arms transfer
agreements for a total of 220 advanced aircraft. By 1984 the cumulative totals
had reached 12 and 976 respectively, and by the end of the decade these
cumulative totals had reached 22 and 1661. These figures can be somewhat
misleading in that attrition and deliveries yet to be made are not included.
But, for comparative purposes these figures highlight the Third World
6Great Britain and FRG are considered together because of their
cooperation in the Tornado aircraft project. France, and Germany, are also
grouped together because of their cooperation with Euromissile.
14
interest in advanced aircraft and how much these weapons have proliferated
in the short span of ten years. When comparing the totals in Figure 1 to all
types of aircraft delivered for roughly the same period, one can further grasp
the significance. From 1982-1989 for all combat aircraft, both supersonic and
subsonic attack and fighters, the total number delivered was 3385 [Ref 12:pp. 1-
591. Thus the ratio of advanced aircraft to total aircraft is approximately 49%.
This figure is significant in that transfers of the world's most capable aircraft
now comprise almost 50% of the export market. More sobering is the fact that
many "experts" now predict that most conflicts will take place within this
Third World environment.
The nations that produce and export advanced aircraft are the same
nations that are capable of producing and exporiing advanced SAMs. These
SAMs are the most advanced type for export and have production and
operation dates in the late 1970s and early 1980s. As shown in Figure 2, the
pattern established for advanced aircraft exports to the Third World holds
true for advanced SAM exports. In 1980 only 1 arms transfer agreement was
signed for these more advanced systems for only 96 missiles. The cumulative
figures for these systems jump dramatically to 8 and 2853 in 1984 and to 18
and 14,972 in 1989. When compiling total SAM deliveries for the period, 1982
-1989, the numbers add up to 33,895 [Ref 12:pp. 1-59]. The SAM ratio is 44%
and shows that as with advanced aircraft, the Third World interest in
advanced SAMs seems to be increasing to a point where certain nations may
well be fielding a substantial number of arms equal in quality to that of
United States systems.
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C. CAPABILITY BY REGION
Because the United States is a maritime nation whose continued growth
and prosperity is dependent to a large extent on free access to the world's
oceans, the U.S. navy is required to operate and maintain a presence in many
regions. To grasp the significance of air defense weapons proliferation,
selected regions and the capabilities of nations within these regions will be
presented. The five regions selected have been chosen because of the U.S.
Navy's high operating tempo within those regions, and because of the area's
strategic significance. The effect proliferation will have on the four navy
missions of sea control, power projection, strategic sealift, and strategic
deterrence, will be discussed in section four. Only capabilities in the
following regions will be described: the Caribbean basin, the Mediterranean,
the North Arabian Sea, the Straits of Malacca, and the Straits of Korea. Table
III shows the extent of air defense weapons proliferation in the five identified
regions. 7
1. The Caribbean Basin
Currently the U.S. Navy does not have any commitments to
maintain a carrier battle group or a surface action group in the Caribbean.
But, the navy does conduct yearly exercises such as UNITAS, and because of
the recent emphasis on drug intervention individual ships and squadrons
have dramatically increased their presence in this region. General interests in
7For an excellent study on U.S. Navy interests, presence, and response, see
the entire Center for Naval Analyses seminar series on "Alternative
Maritime Deployments Projects" [Ref. 131.
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the area can be grouped under the following six categories: economic,
presence of U.S. citizens, geo-politics, stability, facilities, and lines of
communications. 8 Cuba is currently the only nation in the region with
advanced air defense capabilities. These capabilities include the MIG-29, the
SA-13, and the SA-14. The range of the MIG-29 allows for Cuban interdiction
from Florida and Mexico to Central America. The SA-13 and SA-14 enable
Cuban targets to operate knowing they are protected with state-of-the-art
equipment.
2. Mediterranean
For over twenty years the U.S. Navy has maintained 1-2 carrier battle
groups in the Mediterranean as a permanent presence. Current regional
concerns abound, from guarding NATO's southern tier and "monitoring"
Libya to maintaining access to the Suez Canal and protecting U.S. interests in
the never ending Arab-Israeli conflict. Future concerns may involve the
instability that seems to be slowly spreading in the Balkans area. [Ref. 13:p. 2-21
Third World advanced air defense capability seems to be mainly concentrated
in the Central and Eastern sub-regions of the Mediterranean. The four
nations that have advanced capability can be divided into two groups:
potential adversaries, Libya and Syria, and temporary allies, Israel and Egypt.9
Considering the changing state of alliances in the world today, the threat axis
8During a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict, the resupply of Europe would
depend on a substantial amount of equipment that would flow through the
Caribbean Basin [Ref. 13:p. 1-2].
9The 1980s had proved to be a deadly time where the U.S. and Libya are
concerned. As recently as January 4, 1989, two F-14A Tomcats downed two
Libyan MIG-23s in the central Mediterranean.
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could be in any direction.1 0 This threat must certainly be considered serious
by U.S. planners when U.S. forces are operating in the area in small numbers.
A large American force could feel secure, but a smaller force could be
overwhelmed by large numbers of high technology weapons.
3. North Arabian Sea
Since the fall of the Shah of Iran in the late 1970s, the U.S. has kept
1.5 carrier battle groups on station in the Indian Ocean region. This does not
include the five ship MIDEASTFOR that has been in the region since the
British withdrawal. Recently this presence dropped significantly due to the
resolution of the Iran-Iraq war. [Ref. 13:p. 3-3] But, due to the current Kuwait-
Iraq crisis, this presence has grown even larger than when it peaked in 1980s.
Stated United States interests in the region are as diverse as the area is large.
Tanker escort, freedom of navigation operations, embargo enforcement,
assurance to friends, position for crisis response, geo-political interests within
the subcontinent and the Middle East, and secure oil have all been or are
currently considered U.S. national interests. The advanced air defense threat
in the region is equally as large and diverse. As Table III shows, the amount
of advanced weapons in this region is staggering. Almost as staggering a
problem is trying to determine which nation is friendly, and which nation is
a potential adversary. Kuwait is the obvious example of how alliances can
change, but a more subtle current example is Pakistan. In order for the U.S. to
continue supplying military and economic aid to Pakistan, President Bush
1
°The recent visit to Syria by Secretary of State Baker reflects this trend,
along with the fact that the only U.S. ship sunk by a Third World nation in
recent memory was the USS Liberty and she was sunk by Israel!
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must certify to Congress that Pakistan does not have nuclear weapons. As of
fiscal year 1991 the President has not done this and Pakistan stands to lose
$564 million dollars is U.S. aid. [Ref 14: p. 44] If this rift in relations continues,
where will Pakistan and its Moslem population stand in future Middle East
conflicts? These are just a few of the problems that confront the U.S. in this
region of shifting alliances and high navy operating tempo. The nations with
advanced air defense capability in the regions are: Oman, Qatar, Pakistan,
India, Iran, Iraq (Kuwait), Saudi Arabia, Unite& Arab Emirates, and Bahrain.
4. Straits of Malacca
When considering the nations that border the straits, one must
consider that these nations control the most important transit point fer U.S.
WESTPAC forces. This narrow waterway (50 km at its narrowest point) can
easily be threatened by Indonesia, Malaysia, or Singapore. American strategic
interests in the region ate varied and obvious, to include economics, geo-
politics, and crisis response. A less obvious situation which may heighten
U.S. interest in this region is the recent shift in arms transfers. The Middle
East has traditionally been the major importers of arms, but recently, the arms
suppliers have beer, focusing on Asia.1 1 Presently, all three regional nations
are on friendly terms with the U.S., but instability is not unknown to the
region and Islamic fundamentalists (Indonesia) or a right wing turn
(Singapore) could alter the current stability.
1 According to SIPRI, [Ref. 22:p. 1951, the Middle East arms market has
showed considerably, and the new focus is in Asia. But, with the recent jump
in oil prices this trend may reverse itself again.
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When looking at Table III, the existing individual air defense
capability is of little consequence. If, however, the three nations combined
forces in the near future they would possess a potent force in such a narrow
waterway. Recent studies have shown that even with proliferation, U.S.
Naval forces could still fight their way through the Strait, but would be hard
pressed to avoid damage.' 2
5. Korean Straits/Sea of Japan
Assuming North Korea and South Korea do not unite in the swift
fashion of the two Germanies, only the North Korean air defense capabilities
will be discussed. This is a risky proposition considering the world situation,
but with 40,000 troops still in South Korea the assumption seems valid.
American presence is constant, with the carrier battle group permanently
forward deployed in Japan. American interests in the area revolve around
the Japanese and the South Koreans in the economic, geo-political, and
security spheres. In so far as the North Koreans are already considered
adversaries, a potential shift in alliances need not be addressed. While the
North Koreans have tremendous amounts of military equipment, the only
advanced air defense capability currently possessed is the MiG-29. This may
not see.m to be a tremendous threat, but in conjunction with their current
missile threat and other anti ship capability, this threat must be considered
credible. See Table III.
12The study done for the Defense Nuclear Agency [Ref. 15:p. 431 cited the
threat to the USN from cruise and ballistic missiles in the Straits of Malacca.
Using this study it is easy to extrapolate and arrive at the same conclusions
with air defense weapons in place of missiles. The air defense aircraft on
order by the nations in question all have air-to-ground/ship c,-pability.
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Currently most of these regions can be controlled with the conce"tration
of U.S. forces that could be brought to bear against any one or most groups of
these regional nations. But, as the actual numbers, not just types, of these
weapons increase and as U.S. force structure is reduced, the ability of the U.S.
Navy to assure victory may change. Even if the outcome does not change,
the enormous price these advanced weapons may extract in equipment and
personnel may be too high for America to pay while protecting precarious
Third World interests. Figure 3 shows normal U.S. Navy operating areas
throughout the world, and the threat posed to them by the enormous
coverage of Third World air defense weapons. Appendix C shows specific
combat aircraft radii in selected Third World regions.
00
' 
0 Air Defense Radius
Navy Op Atcz
Figure 3. Air Defense Threats in Navy Operating Areas
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TABLE 111. ADVANCED AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY IN THE THRD
WORLD__ 
__
Region Country Missile (SAM) Aircraft Source Status
1--Caribbe-an Basin Cuba SA-13 "Gopher" USSR Deployed
SA-14 "Gren-lin" USSR Deployed
______MIG-29 USSR Deployed
2--Mediterranean Egypt Crotale France Deployed
I-HAWK USA _ Deployed
F-16 USA Deployed
______ __________Mirage-2000 France Deployed
Israel I1-HAWK USA _Deployed
F-1 5 USA Deployed
______F-16 USA Deployed
Libya SA-13 USSR - Deployed
SA-14 USSR Deployed
______Crotale France Deployed
Syria SA-13 USSR Deployed
I____ MIG-29 USSR Deployed
3--North Arabian Bahrain Stinger USA On order
Sea 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_____F-16 USA On order
India ________MIG-29 USSR Deployed
F____ _____________ France Dpoe
Iran ]-HAWK USA _ Deployed
Iraq SA-13 ______USSR Deployed
SA-14 USSR Deployed
Roland I1 Euromissile Deployed
______MIG-29 USSR Deployed
Kuwait I-HAWK USA Deployed
_____ ________F-1 8 USA On order
Oman javelin U K On order
ITornado U K On order
Pakistan Crotale France Deployed
Stinger USA Deployed
______F-16 USA Deployed
Qatar Roland 11 _______ Euromissile Deployed
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TABLE III. ADVANCED AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY IN THE THIRD
_____________WORLD (CONTINUED)
3--North Arabian Qatar Stinger USA Deployed
Sea (Cont'd) (cont'd) ______
______Crotale ______France Deployed






UAE -Crotale _______France Deployed
I-HAWK _____USA Deployed
Miag 200France On order
Region 4--Straits of Indonesia I-Rapier UK Deployed
Malacca
_____ _________F-16 USA On order
Malaysia I-Rapier ______UK On order
javelin U K On order
Tornado U K On order
_________F-16 USA On order
___________ ~re_________F-16 USA On order
5--Straits of Korea N.Kre ________ MIG-29 USSR Deployed
*Source [Ref. 4] and [Ref. 161
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III. THE IMPORT AND EXPORT OF AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY: MOTIVES
AND TRENDS
Having presented a possible Third World scenario with direct effects on
the United States and Western Europe, and having described the extent of
advanced air defense weapons proliferation in regions where the U.S. Navy
has extensive operations and interests, it Is now time to investigate import
and export trends and motives.
A. RECIPIENT MOTIVES
AI, important aspect of Third World arms proliferation is the motivation
behind the buildup. Why do these nations import or desire to produce large
amounts of conventional arms? Will this demand continue at high levels in
the post-cold war period, particularly for air defense weapons? This question
has very complicated answers, yet it does need to be briefly addressed. As
Table IV shows, even though the total amount of arms imported did drop
somewhat in the late 1980s the amounts are still substantial and may increase
again with the current Middle East crisis and rising oil prices. Furthermore,
air defense weapons transfers rose continuously throughout this period.
Even as total imports of conventional weapons slowed in the middle to late
1980s, the trend for updating and replacing air defense weapons continued at
a brisk pace (Figures 1 and 2, and Table III).
Probably the most important rationale for imported arms can be traced to
the breakup of colonial empires and the subsequent rise in the number of
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independent states from approximately 60 to 150. A universal symbol of
sovereignty and status is derived from a certain amount of military power.
TABLE IV. THE LEADING IMPORTERS OF MAJOR WEAPONS, 1985-89
IMPORTERS 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1985-IMPORTERS T_ 1989
India 1876 3683 4585 3383 3819 17,345
Iraq 2871 2447 4247 2005 418 11989
Saudi Arabia 1447 2395 1956 1770 1196 8764
Syria 1690 1508 1169 1172 336 5876
Egypt 1282 1665 2347 348 152 5795
North Korea 977 876 487 1383 1553 5275
Afghanistan 82 611 687 939 2289 4610
Angola 694 975 1135 890 24 3719
Libya 969 1359 294 65 499 3186
Taiwan 664 866 640 513 263 2946
Iran 710 746 685 538 261 2940
Pakistan 675 616 467 467 694 2919
South Korea 388 267 597 934 607 2794
Israel 193 446 1629 327 93 2687
Thailand 305 74 644 510 330 1862
others 5753 5026 4601 4012 3893 23285
TOTAL 20,576 23,560 26,170 19,256 16,427 105,989
* Aggregate imports. Figures are in U.S. $m at constant 1985 prices. Source
[Ref. 16]
This correlates with the low level of armaments in the world as recently
as the 1960s. As many nations started to realize their independence,
superpower competition within the Third World changed this arena into a
25
proxy and leverage battle for political spheres of influence. 13 These leverage
and proxy battles are highlighted by substantial numbers of arms transfers
between the East and West bloc nations and their Third World allies. More
recently as the world became more multi-polar, regional powers have started
to realize their new found strength and independence, and have desired
more advanced weapons for their own motives. Of course the large oil
revenues of the Middle East and the economic boom of the Pacific rim have
played a major role in the ability and motivation to acquire arms. [Ref 17: p.
1311
Certainly every nation has a basic fundamental right to raise and support
some form of military force. But what is the specific rationale for acquiring
air defense weapons? Of course there is a certain status in flying the same
aircraft that the superpowers and European powers fly. Yet the overriding
reason must be linked to sovereignty. Who could deny a nation the right to
protect its pcople and assets? Whereas tanks, ballistic missiles, submarines,
and surface combatants would be considered offensive even to the casual
observer, air defense weapons are not.14 It has been argued that even Iraq has
legitimate needs for advanced air defense weapons. Considering that the
13Why and how nations arm themselves are questions of great
importance for obvious reasons. For an excellent study on the relationship
between military capability and development in Third World countries, see
the study Born Arming by Alden Mullins [Ref. 10].
14The reader must be reminded that this is why these weapons are bought
and sold with less fanfare than "offensive" type weapons. Yet as has been
mentioned previously air defense aircraft usually have a dual capability.
And, these weapons have been used in air defense against U.S. and allied
forces fighting in the Third World.
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Israelis have destroyed an Iraqi nuclear reactor once, and have threatened to
do so again, it is of little wonder that the Iraqis have procured so much
equipment. Iraq has a right to its sovereignty too.15
The motivation for acquiring air defense weapons and other types of
arms has also manifested itself in the form of arms production. The
overriding objective of Third World arms production is the reduction of
dependence on a foreign supplier. Suppliers have a tendency to be unreliable
and unpredictable when situations in a region or in the world change.
Another important reason for indigenous production is economics. The
technology gained through offsets and licensing, and the money saved by
indigenous production are typically held aloft as reasons for production, but
their actual value to a Third World nation are dubious at best. Perhaps a
more probable, yet less quantifiable reason for domestic arms production is
status. The status associated with the production of weapons domestically is a
very real concern to Third World nations [Ref 18: pp. 507-530]. These different
motivations all reflect on the ultimate goal of protecting ones sovereignty. If
a nation cannot depend on a reliable source for defensive weapons, then
there must be an attempt to produce them at home.
Arms importation and production may impede the development of Third
World nations. But more importantly, rather than protect sovereignty,
15Another excellent example of top-of-the-line air defense equipment is
Saudi Arabia. While the Saudis have good military equipment in general,
their air defense equipment is state-of-the-art. This is because of their most
valuable asset, oil, and thus their way of life, is most vulnerable from the air.
See Table V and [Ref. 4].
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these weapons lead to regional instability.16 The direct foreign exchange costs
for imports, and the direct investment costs for production typically d'aw
funds away from more urgently needed areas such as medicine and
education. These costs are then followed by the requirements for
infrastructure, training, and manpower that are needed to maintain these
weapons. This creates a dilemma for arms supplying nations. On the one
hand, a world of sovereign states permits self defense. But, considering the
overall cost of arms on Third World societies and regional stability, this must
be balanced with a prudent policy which minimizes the negative
consequences to both supplier and recipient. It seems clear that from the
demand side of the equation, states will continue to push for the most
advanced air defense systems. This means that it is the suppliers who must
make the appropriate policy choices.
B. THE SUPPLIERS
Having briefly examined the rationale for demand on the part of
developing countries, we now turn to the suppliers. This section examines
the recent export trends of the major suppliers, and which nations will be in
position to continue high technology air defense exports in the future. The
second tier suppliers are also addressed, along with the possible emergence of
new suppliers. The most notable of the second tier suppliers are Brazil and
China. The emergence of Japan as a possible supplier will also be discussed.
161n a study of more than 1,000 militarized disputes since 1816, some
leading to war and others not, it was discovered that a supply of weapons
doesn't inevitably lead to war, but it increases the probability dramatically.
Nations do not go to war without sufficient weapons [Ref. 19:p. 28].
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As the world undergoes a diffusion of power--political, economic, and
military--from the industrialized, developed states to the Third World and
so-called Fourth World (poor and without oil), the acquisition of air defense
weapons, often sophisticated and usually in far greater quantities than the
recipient state previously had, is a critical element of that diffusion. [Ref. 17: p.
4] This diffusion is also seen in the actual production of arms. Evidence
indicates that there is a move towards multinational development and
multinational production of military equipment. Offsets and the exporting of
military production and technology will contribute to the
internationalization and diffusion of arms production [Ref. 20:p. 16]. These
factors as well as many others will effect suppliers and advanced air defense
weapons export trends. Historically, for the major suppliers, there have been
three main justifications for the sale of conventional arms: influence and
leverage, security and stability, and economic benefit [Ref. 17:p. 14].
The Soviet Union and the United States continue to be the world's
dominant suppliers of conventional arms. In 1989 the USSR and the U.S.
controlled 37 and 34 per cent of the global arms market, and an extremely
large percentage of the Third World market [Ref. 16:p. 2211. Following the
USSR and the U.S. in total sales are France, the United Kingdom, China, and
West Germany, whose shares of the market are substantially below those of
the two super powers. An interesting point is the fact that when considering
sales to the industrial world alone, China becomes much less a of factor. The
major suppliers of interest in this thesis are the Soviet Union, the United
States, and Western Europe, since as shown in Table III, they produce and
export the advanced air defense systems.
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As Table V shows, these same nations are also the leading exporters of all
major conventional weapons to the Third World.
TABLE V. THE LEADING EXPORTERS OF MAJOR WEAPONS, 1985-89
Exporters 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1985-
1989
USSR 8563 10327 10759 8238 8515 46402
U.S. 4024 4925 6270 3649 2528 21397
France 3588 3355 2518 1312 1527 12299
China 1017 1193 1960 1781 718 6669
UK 903 1020 1530 1165 993 5610
FRG 395 649 252 480 149 1925
Italy 578 398 319 360 30 1685
Netherlands 38 132 172 134 491 338
Brazil 172 134 491 338 182 1318
Czechoslovakia 124 124 198 176 287 908
Sweden 35 141 298 240 134 847
Spain 139 185 160 206 143 847
Egypt 124 159 194 232 62 771
North Korea 95 48 98 123 - 364
others 621 528 587 437 371 2547
TOTAL 621 528 587 437 371 2547
* Aggregate exports. Figures in U.S. $millions at constant 1985 prices. Source
[Ref. 16].
1. The Soviet Union
Arms sales have traditionally played a greater role in Soviet policy
toward Third World nations than they have in U.S. policy. Yet, the USSR has
had a total of only twenty Third World clients for major systems since 1970.
And a far smaller group accounted for over 75% of all exports: Angola, India,
Iraq, Libya, and Syria. Generally, the reason is that the Western nations have
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more to offer developing nations than just arms. Until this past decade these
arms sales have been dominated by ideological and foreign concerns, but
recently the USSR has expanded sales to the Third World for purely
economic reasons. Countries like Jordan, Kuwait, and Peru, with no
ideological links, have become important new recipients. The USSR appears
to be expanding these sales as a new means to acquire hard currency. [Ref.
21:p. 20] Of course solid assessments of Soviet arms exports are complicated
by the fact that many transfers become public knowledge only when the
deliveries begin. Another complicating factor in this equation is the
economic reforms of President Mikhail Gorbachev and the effect they will
have on the civilian and military industrial base.
When looking at developments in the Soviet Union, it must be
remembered that arms exports constitute a very large portion of overall
production. Arms sales to the Third World are equivalent to over a third of
production in many key industries. These sales help maintain a large
production line which drives Soviet unit costs down and helps preserve a
wartime surge capability. Between 1978 and 1987, Soviet exports of jet combat
aircraft to the Third World were equivalent to 36% of total Soviet production.
Some studies suggest that these exports at times bring in close to 50% of the
total Soviet hard currency earnings. [Ref 21:p. 20]
Over the years the USSR has also maintained production lines of
older equipment exclusively for export. Systems such as the MIG-21 and SA-2
Guideline SAM were solely for export. But, by the early 1980s Third World
nations were not satisfied with less than up to date equipment. The USSR
has always been hesitant to do this, yet they will need to in order to keep their
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market share. One method they use to deal with this dilemma is to sell top of
the line equipment with less advanced features. For example, the export
version of the MIG-29 uses MIG-23 radar rather than the state of the art RP-29
Slot Back. [Ref 21:p. 20]
One major question to be addressed is how Soviet economic reform
will effect their arms transfers to the Third World. This question is vital
when assessing future U.S. plans. President Gorbachev has stated that the
Soviet Union "was in favor of demilitarizing international relations" and he
has proposed "stopping any supplies of arms to all belligerents" in
Afghanistan [Ref. 22:p. 199]. Yet, a major cutback in arms sales is unlikely to
occur. In fact even as the USSR is withdrawing from their Third World
conflicts, arms sales have continued at a normal pace to traditional clients
such as Iraq, Syria, and Libya, 17 and have even increased to Afghanistan since
their withdrawal [Ref. 20:p. 32]. According to Paul Mann writing in Aviation
Week and Space Technology, "perestroika" will more likely have the
following effects on the Soviet military: the pursuit of a wider economic base
of R&D and plant modernization, lengthen procurement schedules, shift
military managers and engineers to the civilian sector, reorganize and
marginally reduce the size of Soviet divisions, increase the friction between
civilian and military sectors, and a heightened emphasis on weapons sales to
generate scarce hard currency in order to implement these reforms. [Ref. 23:p.
19]
17 According to newspaper and television reports, the Soviets are
upholding the United Nations arms embargo against Iraq for the time being.
But, Soviet technical assistants are still in Iraq.
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While Peesident Gorbachev may find arms exports less attractive
politically in the world forum, he needs the currency to bolster his economy.
It is doubtful that he will find weacions sales "immoral" as President Havel
did in Czechoslovakia.1 8 And, air defense weapons are very easy to legitimize
to world opinion. Soviet arms sales will continue as long as there are
markets, but more sophisticated weapons will be the preferred order of the
day. Yet, their market share may erode because their equipment has not
always performed as well as Western equipment.1 9 The USSR is also not as
advanced in advanced aerospace technologies. When a recipient goes
shopping for individual pieces of high technology equipment they usually
turn to the West. The Soviet technological level is typically lower and their
advanced equipment is less desirable in the Third World.
During the period 1982-1989, the USSR delivered 1,955 supersonic
combat aircraft and 26,380 SAMs to the developing nations. This is almost
four times as many aircraft and seven times as many missiles as the U.S.
delivered during the same period [Ref. 25:p. 1251. Of course not all of these air
defense systems are state of the art, but the presence of these systems in the
18 1n addition to the scores of interviews and new reports on the
playwright president, The New York Times (January 25, 1990, p. A-10) reports
that Czechoslovakia will simply end arms sales. Quoting Foreign Minister
Jiri Dienstbier, "Czechoslovakia will simply end its trade in arms without
taking into account what the praginatists will say. The trade will stop even
with the large blow to state coffers, and even though the recipients can get
them elsewhere."
19Matthew M. Hurley addresses some of the deficiencies in the quality and
capability of Soviet-made equipment in his article, "The Bekaa Valley Air
Battle, June 1982: Lessons Mislearned?" (Airpower Journal, Winter 1989, pp.
60-70). Also see [Ref. 24:p. 5221.
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recipiert nations' inventories gives the USSR an added foothold. The parts
and training eventually lead to updated equipment and reliance on the
USSR. Combined with the existing substantial presence, arms control and
CFE cuts in Europe will increase the USSR position within these nations.
The USSR has always been reluctant to scrap equipment and with "peace" in
Europe, they may virtually have a yard sale of excess equipment. 20 For the
foreseeable future the USSR will continue to hold a substantial portion of the
air defense export market due to past practices. And, they will attempt to
increase their market share of hgh technology air defense systems with
modern equipment like the MIG-29. Also, as Gorbachev improves his hold
on power, he will further legitimize the sale of air defense equipment, and
sales of other advanced equipment, like the SU-27, may eventually come to
pass.
2. The United States
The U.S. policy on arms sales is based primarily on political and
foreign policy rationales. Because of the domestic political aspect of arms
sales, it is difficult to predict iong term American export policies. A fairly
recent example of shifting policies was the curtailing of arms sales during
President Carter's administration. Carter believed that arms sales were
"contrary to our long standing beliefs and principles" [Ref. 17:p. 45]. Yet, even
20The large market for arms helps the Soviet armed forces turn over old
inventory and modernize the force structure without resorting to outright
scrapping of old equipment [Ref. 21:p. 201. The New York Times, (November
15, 1990) reported the Soviets were moving equipment east of the Ural
Mountains so it would not have to br scrapped as part of CFE. This
equipment could be sold, stored, or used as replacements.
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with Carter's misgivings about arms sales, the amount of arms sold increased
throughout his administration. Indeed, it could be said that the U.S. has no
coherent long term arms sales policy at all.
For all the changes and shifts in American policy, the U.S. still
maintains a strong second place behind the USSR in sales to the Third World.
Between 1985-89, the U.S. sold over $21 billion worth of major weapons
systems to the Third World. Though the U.S. has sold weapons to over 58
Third World nations since 1985, approximately 70% of the sales have gone to
Egypt, Israel, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and
Brazil in recent years [Ref. 16 :p. 220-224]. Each of these nations, except Saudi
Arabia, were producing weapons other than just ammunition and small
arms by the early 1980s [Ref. 26:p. 161. This may well effect the total amount of
U.S. arms sales abroad, yet before these nations become serious producers they
will have many problems to overcome.
In spite of declining world wide arms exports, and a decreasing Third
World market share, the U.S. will continue to dominate the high technology
arms market. (An integrated Western Europe in 1992 may prove to be the
exception--see next section) The U.S. is among the world leaders if not the
world leader in many advanced technologies: aerospace, airframes, engines,
space/satellite, carbon fibers, ceramics, high speed integrated circuitry, stealth,
and terminal missile defense technology. These technologies are supported
by the worlds largest military R&D budget [Ref. 24:p. 520]. With this in mind
the U.S. will continue to be the leading exporter of high technology weapons
for the near future.
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Even in a changing and shrinking arms market the U.S. will be able
to continue and hold a solid market share because of its own domestic needs
and its ability to influence foreign recipients and suppliers. 21 In most nations,
domestic production depends to a large extent on substantial foreign sales,
where as according to Stephanie G. Neuman, in the U.S. only 5 to 15 percent
of overall defense production is exported. 22 With an annual procurement
budget of approximately $80 billion, the U.S. is relatively insulated from a
declining world market in arms sales [Ref. 24:p. 5211. Arms sales are an
instrument of foreign policy, but sales abroad rarely influence arms
production at home. Of course, depending on the size of the defense in these
times of change, defense contractors may need foreign sales to keep down per
unit costs and to keep open certain weapon production lines.
The main concern here is whether the U.S. will continue to be a
major supplier of air defense weapons. The answer at this stage is obvious.
The U.S. will continue to export large quantities of arms and will continue to
21
"For example, the Swiss decision to buy American F/A-18s rather than
Mirage 2000s reportedly was due not just to technical and operational
considerations but also to expectations of offsets" [Ref. 24:p. 521]. This sale has
recently been put on hold.
22 0f course this overall figure does not apply to air defense equipment
specifically. According to Air International (November, 1987, p. 217)., 2,500
F-16s are currently operational in 15 countries. This number is likely to
increase to 4,400 and 17 countries before the production run is over. This is
well over the 5 to 15 percent figure given by Neuman. But, the U.S. is
generally in a better overall position than most air defense producers.
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dominate the high technology market, including air defense weapons. 23
Budget and defense cuts may even increase the amount of exported arms, but
being the nation with the most desirable type of high technoloF y arms will be
enough to maintain a large portion of the export market. During the period
1983-1987, the U.S. delivered 435 supersonic combat aircraft and 2,114 SAMs
[Ref. 25:p. 1251. These numbers pale in comparison to Soviet figures, but most
of the U.S. deliveries are high technology weapons and with the current
world wide demand for advanced air defense systems the U.S. is in a good
position to capitalize on this trend.
The U.S. has sold tremendous amount of air defense equipment
under the auspices of "defensive sufficiency". But not all of these sales may
be in the national security interest of the U.S.. Certain lucrative markets such
as Iraq and Iran have been avoided recently, and with good reason, given past
experience with countries such as Vietnam and Iran. U.S. forces have had to
plan contingencies against these nations, while also planning to fight against
U.S. supplied weapons. U.S. forces typically plan for battle against Soviet
made weapons. Western weapons are much more difficult to defend against.
The U.S. has already sold Saudi Arabia over 40 F-15s with more M-1A1 tanks
and F-15 jets on the way. Will the U.S. be as willing to protect the oil fields
23The European "yard sale" will not be limited to the USSR. The article
"The Adverse Effect of Disarmament," (see Defense & Armament Heracles
International, April 1990, pp. 8-9) discusses Moroccan and Egyptian interest in
M-60 tanks and F-16 fighters that are to be pulled out of Europe. There is talk
of these units being sold for the price of transportation only.
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given these transfers? 24 As the sale of U.S. high technology air defense
equipment continues, it is only a matter of time until U.S. troops actually
confront these weapons in combat.
3. Western Europe--EEC 1992.
France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the United Kingdom
are the largest weapons exporters in Europe and are grouped here because of
their similarities as arms exporters when compared to the superpowers or
Third World producers. Each of these nations sell weapons that are in the
high technology range of the export spectrum.25
France is the only non-superpower to develop, design, and produce
its own complete range of high technology conventional arms. The FRG and
UK do this to a lesser extent then the French, and offset any deficiencies with
joint arms production ventures (Tornado) and imports from the U.S.. With
limited domestic demand the per unit costs of these advanced systems
continues to grow. This says nothing about the "price of entry" into a new
weapon system with new materials, processes, design approach,
manufacturing methods, and operational technique. On the average the cost
of ever more complex combat aircraft have increased by a factor of 10 every 18
years. Of course inflation plays a part in this price increase, but the ever more
complex technologies are the major reason for driving the price up [Ref. 27:p.
2442 FA-18 Hornets have been sold to Kuwait. These aircraft will
obviously not be delivered for quite a while. If they had been, the U.S. may be
threatened with these as well as French and Soviet state-of-the-art aircraft
[Ref. 16:p. 285].
25Sweden will not be addressed here, but its lone high technology export
system, updated RBS-70 SAMs, could certainly be considered advanced.
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12]. Because these nations are aware that they are unable to continue
autonomous defense production they strive to increase their foreign arms
sales. It has been estimated that well over half of Dassault's family of Mirage
jet fighters have been exported, sometimes to the detriment of the French Air
Force [Ref. 28:pp. 211-212]. With absorption problems and, until recently,
decreasing oil prices, the typical recipient of European arms has decreased its
imports. This is causing the European suppliers to search for new markcts.
Even if these new markets are found it is unlikely that Western European
nations will be able to maintain autonomous production capabilitie3 without
more cooperation among themselves.
In general terms defense trade is excluded from the European
Community (EC) trade by article 223 of the Treaty of Rome, ensuring that
national security remains a domestic concern. Yet because the numerous
problems of autonomous production have been recognized by the Western
allies, two other groups have been formed to tackle defense problems: the
Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) and the Western European
Union (WEU). The IEPG was formed to promote more European
collaboration in defense equipment, while the WEU was formed as a way for
Europe to shape defense policy without the participation of the United States.
While these groups enhance cooperation, there is as yet no formal document
to merge European defense industry. But, many European companies are
already seeking cross-border alliances through mergers, acquisitions and other
39
measures to take advantage of a European wide market. Even U.S.
companies are actively trying to team with European companies before 1992.26
It seems that if the Western Europeans can get past the
"nationalism" of autonomous defense production, a single European defense
industry/market will be a self-fulfilling prophecy. If collaboration and
cooperation do not increase, their only alternative is to rely totally on the U.S.
for high technology state of the art weapons. This would be unacceptable to
the Europeans. With this in mind it is likely that after EC-92, exports will
probably continue at the combined current rate due to European reliability as
suppliers and the desirability of high quality/technology systems. This most
certainly insures that advanced air defense systems made in Europe will
continue to proliferate in the Third World.
4. Other Suppliers
When addressing the prominence of secondary suppliers of major
weapon systems one must look into Third World arms production. The
production of major weapons systems is still concentrated among relatively
few Third World nations. Cooperative ventures and licensed production
account for a substantial portion of these major weapons systems being
developed in the Third World. Third World producers account for
approximately 20 percent of the world's arms market [Ref. 29:p. 72]. Though
20 percent of the arms market may seem to be a substantial portion, this
figure is divided among many nations. In conjunction with this figure is the
26For an excellent study that highlights the internationalizing of the West
European defense industrial base, see Andrew Moravcsik's "The European
Armaments Industry at the Crossroads," Survival, January/February 1990.
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fact that most of these systems are in the low to medium technology range.
While the need for high technology weapons has certainly been
demonstrated in recent conflicts, and are in fact in demand, simple weapons
in large quantities are also in high demand. This is the market where most
Third World nations compete. There are many reasons why Third World
nations decide to produce arms--historic geographic rivalries, political
decisions, military necessity, economics, or national pride. But, the
overriding reason that prevents successful high technology or long term
production is economic. Economic limitations such as infrastructure,
education, and manpower, along with the shrinking international arms
market prevent most nations from gaining a substantial foothold. Few
nations have the potential to enter this high technology export group. Three
who have attempted to do so are China, Brazil, and Israel.
a. China
As Table I clearly shows, the Chinese transferred a substantial
amount of arms throughout the 1980s. Between 1980-1987, 74 percent of
China's arms transfers agreements were with Iran and Iraq [Ref. 30:pp 21-23].
This windfall has dwindled due to a resolution of the conflict. Most weapons
exported by China are modified clones of older Soviet weapons. Though
these clones are effective, specifically in an Iran-Iraq type war, they are 1960s
vintage in the low or medium technology range. Through these weapons
sales China has been able to finance its own future weapons programs.
Sharing technology and buying relatively small amounts of military
equipment from Western Europe, Australia, the U.S., and most extensively
form Israel, has enabled the Chinese to increase the technological level of
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their equipment. As of yet, though, the Chinese do not have the capability to
export high technology air defense weapons. But they have established a
niche in the Third World with large numbers of simple, inexpensive, yet
effective weapons. 27
b. Brazil
Brazil has become a prominent second tier arms supplier in the
world, and has garnered advanced technology as a result of arms sales, co-
production, and licensed production. Through its arms industry Brazil has
gained enormous access to advanced technology from many nations, and in
fact produces components and high technology products for developed
nations such as France, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.. For all the
tremendous strides in recent years, Brazil still has a long way to go.
Financing problems, a huge foreign debt, and a country that is simultaneously
poverty stricken and industrialized has kept Brazil second tier. While Brazil
has excelled in areas such as armored vehicles, and is in fact the sixth largest
aircraft producer in the world, their air defense products are not yet in the
high technology range. Currently, a joint Italo-Brazilian aircraft, the AMX, is
being built. The AMX is a subsonic, dual mission aircraft that will be the
most advanced aircraft made in South America. [Ref. 31:pp. 1676-16771 While
the AMX will be capable, it will not compete with the latest generation of
27The Chinese Silkworm missile was a factor in the Persian Gulf "Tanker
War," and it is a relatively "old" and low tech cruise missile. The Chinese see
themselves as "important" and as a "champion" of many Third World
countries, and this is partially manifested by their arms trade practices around
the world. A complete study of the Chinese arms trade can be found in China
and the Arms Trade by Anne Gilks and Gerald Segal.
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advanced aircraft. Brazil is a reliable supplier with a enormous potential to
join the major supplier ranks. Yet, there are still many limitations. Major
exports still require imported components, the world economy effects the
Brazilian economy tremendously, and the resolution of the Iraq-Iran conflict
reduces the capital available to keep Brazil on the leading edge.28
c. Israel
Israel is an important second tier supplier who has recently faced
more competition from emerging arms suppliers such as Brazil. Because of
its need to insure the survival of the Israeli state, and a certain amount of
independence, Israel developed its own high technology arms production
capability. To support arms production, Israel has relied on a substantial
number of exports. Exports can be divided into five categories: services, re-
exports, local manufactures, technology, and offsets [Ref. 26:p. 182]. Other
than re-exporting aircraft such as the Mirage III and a few sales of the Israeli
built Kfir, air defense exports are not extensive at all. The danger posed by
Israel is in the export of technology. The Israelis have developed electronics
equipment at a level of technological advancement well ahead of many
industrial countries [Ref. 16:p. 237].29 Also, having developed the Lavi
28For a complete study on the Brazilian defense industry see the two-part
series in International Defense Review (August 1989 and December 1989)
entitled "The Brazilian Defense Industry," by Rene Luria. Also, [Ref. 26] has
an entire chapter on Brazil by P. Lock entitled "Brazil: Arms for Export."
29The advanced Israeli electronics industry has been instrumental in
maintaining their air defense superiority in a volatile region. This advanced
indigenous capability was a key in their victory over Syria in 1982. See "The
Bekaa Valley Air Battle, June 1982: Lessons Mislearned?" (Airpower Journal,
Winter 1989, pp. 63-3). For a complete listing of Israeli military electronics
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aircraft, which is in the advanced technology range, and through operating
the F-15/16, the Israelis are capable helping some second tier nations such as
China develop a first line jet aircraft. Israel's defense industry is economically
limited in size and thus cannot produce all of the advanced equipment it is
capable of developing. The Lavi is an example. But Israel can export its
technology to other Third World nations.
d. Japan
The Japanese need to be addressed because of their unique
position in the industrial world. Their "special status" is due to their self
imposed arms transfer restrictions while being able to produce some of the
most technologically advanced equipment in the world.
The United States and Japan have the two largest, most technologically
advanced economies in the world and have become intrinsically dependent
upon the other. Their trade comprises 35% of the world total. The United
States consumes 30% of Japan's total foreign trade, and is the recipient of 46%
of Japan's direct foreign investment [Ref. 32:pp. 46-491. This unique
relationship has enabled the Japanese to pursue a very ambitious and
successful economic plan. Japanese economic success is not limited to the
civilian sector, Mitsubishi and Kawasaki Heavy Industries derived 21.3% and
19.6% of total company sales from defense in 1988. And while the U.S. is
becoming more dependent on Japanese components, the Japanese are
becoming less dependent on U.S. technology. The Japanese currently make
their own surface naval combatants, armored vehicles, and F-1 fighter. Also,
programmes, see Jane's Military Communications 1989 and Jane's Radar and
Electronic Warfare 1989-90.
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they produce the F-15 aircraft, and the HAWK and Patriot surface to air
missile under license. 30 The Japanese also maneuvered to develop the FSX
indigenously at home, but the Toshiba incident weakened their position [Ref.
33:pp. 31-35]. Currently, based on 1990 SIPRI figures, the Japanese imported
over $3 billion worth of military equipment in 1989 alone, and exported very
little. Yet it seems that the Japanese are positioning themselves to be able to
export high technology equipment in a short time if their government
changes current military export policy.31 The Japanese could certainly rival
the U.S. and Europeans in any of the high technology air defense fields if they
choose to and if they are willing to make the enormous investment required.
C. SUMMARY
The three main justifications for the export of conventional arms:
influence and leverage, security and stability, and economics will continue to
dominate the world arena. These justifications will shift in relative
importance to individual suppliers, but in general they will continue to hold
30The Japanese do not yet produce any first line air defense equipment on
their own. All of their high quality equipment is currently built under U.S.
license. For a complete report on the Japanese arms industry see "Japan:
Evolution of the Arms Merchant," by Kevin Novak (prepared for Professor
Laurance NS 4250 Naval Postgraduate School, March 1988) and "Japan: Arms
Exporter for the 21st Century," by Duane C. Dick (prepared for the California
Seminar on International Security and Foreign Policy, University of
California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, February 1988).
31Industry has continually pressured the government to allow the export
of items not strictly arms. Dual use items such as the V-107 helicopters and
the YS-11 aircraft have been exported to various military forces around the
world [Ref. 10:p. 37].
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true. The fluctuating foreign policy of the USSR will see them rely more on
high technology sales for almost purely economic reasons in the near future.
The West Europeans will slowly evolve into more unified producers with
ever more extensive collaboration between borders to maintain their
domestic base and conserve the economic resources. The U.S. will continue
to lead in high technology exports for a variety of all three reasons, yet change
will also effect the U.S.. And, the Japanese certainly have the potential and
will probably be entering the export market in the next 10 years.
The arms trade is in transition, becoming more complex and varied than
in the past. Defense budgets are getting tight the world over, weapons are
getting more complex and costly, R&D costs are growing tremendously, and
the numbers of weapons produced is declining. These factors are affecting
industries everywhere, including the U.S. To ease these skyrocketing costs,
international cooperation, consortiums, co-production, licensing, and foreign
investment into industries will be more commonplace [Ref. 24:p. 527]. It is
inevitable that arms sales will accompany these changes as a means to recover
investment, lower costs, and make a profit. Unfortunately the effects of these
sales are not always realized until well after the fact. Recently, according to
SIPRI, even as exports to the Middle East arms market have declined, there
has been a shift in arms sales toward South Asia.
Accepting the premise that major suppliers will continue to export
advanced air defense capability, and given the fact that significant capability
already exists, the next logical step is to examine the effect this proliferation
will have on the U.S. Navy's missions. The following section will outline
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the four naval missions and discuss the implications proliferation will have
on them.
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IV. IMPLICATIONS OF AIR DEFENSE PROLIFERATION FOR NAVAL
MISSIONS
To address the impact and implications of air defense weapons
proliferation, one must look at the four specific U.S. Navy missions.
Without arguing definitions or degree, the U.S. is considered a "maritime"
nation by most. Because of this the U.S. must maint :n unrestricted access to
the world's ereans to protect its three global interests; economic well-being
national security, and world order. To protect these interests in a dynamic
world U.S. leaders have turiled to the Navy to implement policy. The
Department of the Navy maintains approximately 100 ships and 33% of its
marine force deployed on day to day operations outside the U.S. in support of
the national objectives.12 These forces, according to Barry M. Blechman and
Ster'.--n S. Kapian in their book Force Without War, were used in 177 of 215
crises between 1946 and 1975. This is more than four out of every five
incidents [Ref. 34:p. 38]. The choice of the navy to protect national interests is
obviously due to the flexibility of aircraft carrier battle groups, submarines,
and amphibious forces. Their short reaction time, staying power, the ability
to be withdrawn quickly, and their non-infringement upon another's
sovereignty enable these forces to contain conflicts, limit escalation, and deter
further aggression. With this in mind the navy is required to carry out four
32These figu:es represent the "normal" forward presence of naval forces,
and are considerably lower than current figures due to the Iraq-Kuwait crisis.
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distinct missions: sea control, strategic sealift, power projection, and strategic
deterrence [Ref. 15:p.14].
A. SEA CONTROL
Sea control according to NWP-IA:
"is the fundamental function of the U.S. Navy and connot. . control of
designated sea areas and the associated air space and underwater
volume. It does not imply simultaneous control of all the earth's ocean
area, but is a selective function exercised only when and where needed.
Sea control is achieved by the engagement and destruction of hostile
aircraft, ships and submarines at sea, or by the deterrence of hostile
action through the threat of destruction. Sea control is a requirement for
most naval operations. It is required so that the U.S. Navy may have
operating areas that are secure for the projection of power, such as carrier
strike or amphibious assauit, and sea lines of communication (SLOC)
that allow the buildup and resupply of allied forces in the theater of
operations, and the free flow of strategic resources. Effective sea control
also enhances security for the nation's sea-based strategic deterrent." [Ref.
15:p. 15]
Sea control is a relative term and has different meanings during peace
and war. In an escalating situation, sea control can go from a forward
presence, such as goodwill visits, to freedom of navigation operations, (FON
ops), to military action such as air strikes or amphibious assaults. The
"amount" of sea control depends on the level of violence required and the
political goals of a given situation. With the proliferation of aircraft, and
SAMs to the Third World, control of airspace, once assured, could now be
considered precarious at best. It seems sea control can be contested by even
small nations out to a distance that is only limited by aircraft range and
targeting ability.
49
Considerable emphasis has recently been put on the proliferation of
cruise and ballistic missiles. 33 But, ballistic missiles have yet to be used
against naval assets, and cruise missiles have a direct relationship to air
defense weapons. During the Falklands War in 1982, the Royal Navy lost the
HMS Sheffield and MV Atlantic Conveyor to Argentinean air-launched
Exocet cruise missiles [Ref. 35:p. 66]. Both the Exocet and the aircraft that
launched it, an A-4, are not state of the art equipment by any measure. The
chances of success against the U.S. Navy in that particular environment
would be considerably reduced given U.S. Navy equipment; Aegis air defense,
the F-14 air superiority fighter, and the E-2C AEW platform. But, given the
scenario presented in this paper, the U.S. Navy in the Arabian Sea, the
situation changes dramatically. Indian operates substantial numbers of state
of the art air defense equipment which would require the navy to deploy a
large number of CVBGs to assure air control in a sea control environment. If
air control is assured, the air launched cruise missile threat diminishes
greatly. Sea control is not only a mission itself, it also directly relates to the
other navy missions.
B. STRATEGIC SEALIFT
Strategic sealift is the second naval mission which relies on effective sea
control/air control to safely be completed. Whether the situation is a
331n addition to scores of newspaper articles and journal reports on the
subject of missile proliferation, other studies include: Ballistic and Cruise
Missile Proliferation in the Third World (Hearing before the U.S. Senate
Armed Services Committee, 2 May 1989); Aaron Karp's "Ballistic Missile
Proliferation in the Third World," (SIPRI Yearbook 1989); [Ref. 15]; and [Ref.
351.
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NATO/Warsaw conflict in Europe, or the escort of merchant shipping and
tankers in regional hot spots, air superiority is essential. The very nature of
this mission, slow escorted merchants and fixed position straits and ports,
enable many Third World nations to threaten its successful completion.
While at sea the air threat from regional Third World nations would be
considered minimal. Unlike the Soviet Union, Third World nations do not
have the ability to target ships on the open seas, nor do these nations have
the capability to operate their limited numbers of carriers and cruisers away
from home ports for an extended time. It is only when ships are close to
shore and can be targeted with human spotters, or when they operate in a
confined or obvious areas, that the threat from the air would be dangerous.
As sealift units approach shore facilities cr fixed position straits, the specter of
danger increases and air superiority is a must. With the targeting problem
over, the Third World nation need only mass enough firepower to attack the
facility or ship. In the scenario presented, the port facilities at Karachi are
well within the range of India's MIG-29s and Mirage 2000s. With this
capability India could conceivable control the skies over Pakistan unless an
enormous U.S. effort was made to counter this. With superior air defense
aircraft, India could attack resupply ships at will. The nature of tais threat
also has tremendous implications if the sea lift situation if reversed. As oil
tankers pass through straits or travel on known merchant routes, they are
easy targets for an enemy intent on attacking. If a potential threat is
identified, and if the air defense capabilities associated with that threat are
substantial, then U.S. air power is essential for merchant protection.
Strategically, the interdiction of important merchants going to or coming
51
from American allies could seriously effect the economy of the U.S. or the
sovereignty her allies. Air control is imperative to the safe completion of this
mission.
C POWER PROJECTION
The third naval mission, power projection, is comprised of three basic
elements: naval shore bombardment, amphibious assaults, and carrier based
air strikes. Each of these elements relies on air superiority for effectiveness
and mission success. Each of these missions, to a certain degree, has been
adversely impacted by the amount of air defense weapons proliferation in
various regions in the world.
Naval shore bombardment has been an effective weapon in low to
medium threat environments. But, even the longest range guns onboard
battleships have the relatively short range of 23 miles. This type of range
severely limits the Third World regions where this mission can now be safely
accomplished. If a Third World nation has the air defense capability to
control the air, then the air launched cruise missile threat would be so great
as to preclude the use of naval bombardment.
The success or failure of amphibious assaults is a direct result of who
commands the air. Marine fixed wing and rotary air to ground units are a
potent force for assaulting and establishing beachheads. But, in many regions
of the world, they would be met with advanced SAMs of both Western and
Soviet design.34 These SAMs would certainly be used in conjunction with
34According to Mark A. King, [Ref. 36:p. 33], Marine Corps doctrine is
based on the assumption of air superiority and makes no provision for action
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advanced aircraft. Defensive measures against Western SAMs, as mentioned
previously, is somewhat limited. Also, while the AV-8B is an excellent
aircraft, its air-to-air capability against a fourth generation fighter would be
suspect due to its lack of radar and in the fact that it only carriers Sidewinder
AAMs [Ref. 11:p. 403]. In addition, the only SAM capability currently in the
Marine Corps inventory is a limited number of HAWK batteries and the man
portable Stinger. As air defense capability in the Third World continues to
proliferate, amphibious operations will move further down the threat level
ladder. Without a preponderate amount of allied air power, amphibious
operations will be limited to low threat environments, or large losses must be
expected. This is without even considering the ballistic missile threat that is
also out in the Third World.35 When trying to project power ashore, halfway
around the world and from the sea, air defense weapons and ballistic missiles
can be great equalizers and force multipliers. Controlling the threat
emanating from the air is essential for mission success.
Carrier based air strikes is the mantle upon or which the navy rests its
tactical mission viability. This mission is brok,n down into two parts;
protection of the carrier itself, and survivability of the aircraft performing the
strike mission. In the given scenario, the carriers themselves would be
should that assumption prove false. The Marines have "no written doctrine
that does not assume air superiority." Unfortunately this the same
assumption that has been used in past conflicts such as Vietnam. But, in
South Vietnam there was in fact no threat for air defense weapons. This
assumption will not hold true in future conflicts.
35For seven excellent scenarios which present the implications of ballistic
missile proliferation for the U.S. Navy, see [Ref. 15:pp. 23-58].
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relatively safe due to distance and constant movement. But, in a confined
strait or waterway, a single CVBG could be overwhelmed by air launched
cruise missiles from platforms protected by the advanced fighters of an
adversary. Yet, this scenario is limited and restricted to remote regions of the
world. The more realistic and probable threat is to the aircraft carrying out
strike missions. As shown in the section two, the proliferation of advanced
air defense weapons is a world wide problem. Considering the A-6 Intruder is
the principle carrier strike weapon and it is very rearly 30 years old, its
capability against advanced weapons is becoming limited.36 Contributing to
this problem is the fact that the EA-6B EW/ECM platform is designed with
Soviet systems in mind. This means that without modifications, U.S.
"jamming" of many regional nations' SAMs would be limited. During the
recent Iran-Iraq conflict, Iranian I-HAWK SAM batteries were a major
concern to tactical aircrew planners. If a conventional strike were carried out
against India in the given scenario, the resulting losses would be significant.
Not all Third World/Low Intensity conflicts would be as benign as Grenada
or Panama.
Currently, Iraq is at the forefront of most naval strike planners minds.
While Iraq does not have enough high technology equipment to to defeat
400,000 U.S. troops, they do have SA-13s, SA-14s, and MIG-29s. The Iraqis also
have access to captured Kuwaiti I-HAWKs. These air defense weapons will
36The first A-6 flew in April 1960, and the Navy took delivery of its first
A-6 in 1963 [Ref. 11:p. 4051
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effect strike phns and must be silenced in order to ensure a successful U.S.
attack form the air.
D. STRATEGIC DETERRENCE
The confidence in the survivability of U.S. strategic deterrence is unique
to the navy SSBN force. Having an assured first or second strike capability
should dissuade any rational nation from attacking U.S. forces with a weapon
of mass destruction. Yet, this force does little to deter a Third World conflict
as the current Iraq-Kuwait crisis shows, and in fact is not normally associated
with the Third World. However, as Third World nuclear capability grows,
the U.S. may have to readdress some of its own policies in order to deter
Third World use of these weapons, or use of these weapons against the U.S..
According to a recent Delphi survey of leading civilian and military experts,
naval forces due to their visibility, sustainability, and timeliness of potential
response, constituted the most credible Third World deterrent [Ref. 35:p. 84].
This deterrent would more than likely come in the form of the TLAM. 37
Where as TLAM are highly survivable, they fly relatively slow and are
capable of being intercepted with advanced radar, missiles, and aircraft.
As shown, the proliferation of air defense weapons to the Third World has
the potential to interfere with the four missions of the U.S. Navy. The navy
must realize that these threats exist in certain regions and that they will have
a definite impact in the coming years on tactics, training, and the conduct of
37The TAC AIR component of the Navy, A-6, A-7, and A-18, still plan and
practice for the use of tactical nuclear weapons, though it is doubtful that they
would be used if TLAM/C were available.
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combat operations. Today most threats in the Third World can still be
classified as low to medium, and can be considered limited. As these nations
experience growth in their economy, population educational level, etc., their
military ability will also increase. Currently many regional nations have the
desire, will and the equipment, but until their GNP grows, their training and
infrastructure will limit their overall capability. Ignoring this Third World




Today's world environment bears little resemblance to the bipolar, or
Cold War world of just a few short years ago. Gone is the stability and
predictability of the Soviet Union and Soviet clients throughout the Third
World. In this new multi-polar world, nations are no longer easily restrained
by their traditional bloc allies and are more able to act unilaterally.
Complicating matters has been the rapid build up of air defense forces in
these Third World regions. As shown air defense weapon proliferation is
extensive, it will continue for the foreseeable future, and will pose an ever
increasing threat to United States and other allied forces operating
throughout the world. The implications from this threat require planners to
consider different policy options in order to realistically approach this
problem in a changing world. Three policy options open to American leaders
will be discussed here. First, possible U.S. military responses to the threat will
be addressed, second, an adjustment or control of the threat through arms
control will be briefly discussed, and third, an adjusting of U.S. interests in the
Third World will be put forth.
A. ADJUSTING THE RESPONSE
The United States has a long history of intervention in the Third World
when the President deemed U.S. interests where at stake. Recently, U.S.
intervention has been used when American forces have had overwhelming
superiority in numbers and weapons and could generally be considered low
risk. Operations such as the Alpha strike on Lebanon, Grenada, Panama and
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the U.S. raid in Libya are examples of low risk ventures. This limited
approach is a reflection on the post Vietnam attitude of the military and their
reluctance to commit forces without certain criteria being met [Ref. 37:pp.672-
6731. These interventions have been in response to perceived provocations or
an actual incident that claimed American lives. This type of limited response
has been typical in the post Vietnam era.38 But, this retaliatory type response
will become more difficult as advanced air defense weapons continue to
proliferate throughout the Third World. A new response must be considered
that addresses this proliferation and !he serious threat these weapons will
pose to U.S. forces. Two such responses to be considered are, a "rollback" of
air defense weapons in the field, or a preemptive strike on these weapons
before they can be used against the U.S. or her allies. 39
The common restricting thread between "rollback" and preemptive
strikes is that it has not been U.S. policy to act militarily without some
provocation. 40 While a reason for a preemptive strike can always be thought
of, it is difficult to justify taking out a nations defensive capability because it
may pose a future threat to U.S. forces. While this type of action plays well in
38 post Vietnam response policy, with respect to the Third World, can be
described as a U.S. policy of retaliation or response to attacks on U.S. interests
or citizens around the world.
39 The quintessential "rollback" and preemptive strike were both
accomplished by the Israelis. Their air st-ikes on Syrian SAM positions in the
Bekaa Valley and on the Iraqi nuclear power plant show the positive effects of
this type of response.
40 Even hemispheric invasions such as Grenada and Panama had
provocations which precipitated military action.
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Israel, it not typical of American policy and would not play well at home. At
the extreme end of this response would be the "rollback" of substantial forces
already in place. Even if a reason or provocation existed to "rollback" certain
weapons, will the President, Congress, or public be willing to accept the losses
associated with a strike against a well armed Third World nation? Certainly
most Americans deplore the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and support economic
sanctions in an effort to drive out the Iraqi invaders. But, this broad support
loses its appeal when talk of an offensive "rollback" of the Iraqi forces is
mentioned. Substantial losses have always been assumed when the
adversary was the Soviet Union, but losing 40,000 men in an attack on Iraq is
generally unacceptable to the American people. This example takes into
account more than just air defense weapons, yet with advanced air defense
systems in many nations and the zero-loss attitude of many Americans, even
an smaller scale "rollback" with less loss of life would be difficult to justify in
the final accounting.
B. ADJUSTING THE THREAT
The second policy option available to U.S. leaders and planners is an
adjustment or control of the air defense threat itself through conventional
arms transfer limitations. If a consensus for an appropriate military response
cannot be gathered, perhaps the less dangerous method of arms control can be
used.
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Conventional arms transfer limitations approaches have traveled a long
and mixed path with generally unproductive results. 41 As far back as the
Middle Ages there were informal agreements among Christian nations not to
transfer weapons to the "infidel" Turks [Ref. 17:p. 281]. The most recent
attempt at arms limitations were the Conventional Arms Transfer Talks
(CATT) between the Soviet Union and the United States. These talks
eventually ended in failure, but some progress was made even as many
problems were brought out in the open.42 A major problem exposed was the
difficulty in getting major suppliers to join the talks and then expect them to
limit transfers to traditional recipients. Today, the supplier problems are
even larger. If the major suppliers agree to limitations, there are now
numerous second and third tier suppliers to step in and take their place.
And, the economic benefits are starting to play an ever larger role with
suppliers as defense cuts raise the unit cost of equipment.
In addition to the supplier end problems, there are numerous problems
associated with getting recipients to agree to limit arms imports. To date the
only major recipient-initiated multilateral arms limitation attempt is the
Ayacucho proposals in South America during the mid 1970s. But, these
proposals were extremely limited in that they did not consider the supplier's
side, they were not comprehensive, and did not address converting military
41For a complete study on arms transfer limitations and the Third World,
see [Ref. 381.
42The CATT failed mainly due to limited support within the Executive
(Carter) branch and the bureaucratic struggle between the State Department
and the NSC [Ref. 38:pp. 119-1201.
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technology and products into civilian products [Ref. 38:p. 1801. Another
problem associated with recipient end control is the idea that arms are a
sovereign right of every nation. Recipients view supplier restraint as
paternalistic and discriminatory, and it is argued that their legitimate defense
needs are not taken into account [Ref. 38:p. 6]. It would be difficult to imagine
nations such as India and Pakistan, China and Vietnam, North and South
Korea, or Israel and Arab nations joining in any type of significant regional
arms limitations.
With the end of the Cold War, blossoming super power relations, and
new vitality in the United Nations, chances for arms transfer limitations
have never beeL better. One example of cooperation is the missile technology
control regime (MTCR). The MTCR is a 1987 agreement among the United
States, Canada, Great Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, and Japan which
places export controls over iwo broad categories of technologies: missile
systems, subsystems and the means to produce them; and critical
components. The agreement applies only to systems capable of carrying 500
kg payloads, with a range of at least 300 km. While the MTCR is a significant
achievement, it seems at this point to be a case of "too little too late". There is
no monitoring agency and compliance and interpretation are left to the
discretion of the individual nation. Perhaps the most blatant example of the
regimes weakness is the French. France and Brazil have continued to
negotiate missile related rocket engine technology despite U.S. protests. The
U.S. has even been involved with controversial technology transfer
negotiations. The U.S. continues to discuss transfers of space technology with
India. Perhaps more important are the nations which are not part of the
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MTCR; China and the USSR. Both nations have significant financial and
political stakes in missile-related exports, and are likely to continue their non
-participation in MTCR. [Ref 39:pp. 12-131 Another important aspect of
technology transfer that is omitted in the agreement involves the hiring of
consultants. It is difficult for capitalist Western countries to outlaw the
selling of ideas and knowledge by expatriates.43
Overall, the chances for a significant arms transfer limitation treaty ever
coming about are extremely poor. Few nations would be willing to limit their
sovereignty by allowing a treaty to dictate to them what arms the), can sell or
buy, especially air "defense" weapons. Experts in the field of conventional
arms cannot even agree as to how to go about beginning the arms transfer
limitation process, therefore it is doubtful that limitation talks, much lesc a
treaty, will come about in the near future.4 4
C ADJUSTING THE NATIONAL INTEREST
A great power according to Lord Palmerston has "no permanent friends,"
"no permanent enemies," only "permanent interests". This often-used quote
is tossed around frequently with a nai': be',V4 'hat it is straight forward and
simple. Nothing could be further from the ,'uth. It would be difficult if not
impossible to define what America's permanent national interests are,
43The details of the MTCR guidelines appear in "Missile Technology
Control Regime: Fact Sheet," Department of Defense, April 16, 1987.
44Two leading authorities in the field of conventional arms, Andrew J.
Pierre and Thomas Ohlson, have differing opinions. Pierre suggests supplier
initiated, regionally oriented arms limitations, while Ohlson concludes the
initiative must come from the recipient side [Ref. 38:p. 242].
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especially with respect to the Third World. To the authors of the United
States Constitution, U.S. national security interests were simply "to ensure
domestic tranquility and provide for the common defense". However,
beginning December 7, 1941 U.S. national interests changed drastically. No
longer could the U.S. sit back and watch the world change and then act or
intervene at its convenience. The world has now changed again and U.S.
national interests must adjust in order for the U.S. to maintain its unique
position and standard of living in the world. The U.S. and all the nations of
the world are becoming more interdependent on one another in all facets of
life. Economics, ecology, and the population of all nations are becoming
increasingly intertwined. The future international environment and the
scenarios that might be produced are a concern to all. With this new world
order and with the proliferation of advanced weapons, the U.S. must clearly
define what her national interests are, and be ready to stand together once the
President and Congress have committed the nation. If the U.S. maintains a
zero-loss attitude, cannot control the proliferation of air defense weapons, or
if she can not stand firm while facing advanced weapons, then all credibility
and interests within the Third World could be lost.
This section addresses the policy optien of adjusting U.S. national
interests in the Third World and how a new world order might effect these
interests in the future. Beginning with a historical summary of past national
interests, this section will address what the vital U.S. national interests are,
and what they should be with respect to the Third World.
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1. U.S. National Interests--One Historical View
Before addressing U.S. national interests, post 1989-90, a short
definition, and a brief synopsis of past U.S. interests must be put forth.
National interests riay be defined as a "nation's perceived needs and
aspirations in relation to other sovereign states constituting its external
environment". U.S. national interests are the product of a political process in
which the country's elected national leadership arrives at decisions about the
importance of specific external events that affect the nations political,
military, and economic well being. The determination of this national
interest is influenced by interest groups, bureaucratic structure, and various
political factions. But ultimately the President has to make a judgment about
the extent to which the national interest is involved in a specific
international issue or crisis. [Ref. 40:p. 7] The U.S. has had various changing
economic interests, and various unchanging defense of the homeland
interests in its history as an independent nation. The U.S. has also had
periods in its history where certain basic interests were pursued for relatively
long periods of time, independent of politics and special interests. The basic
national interests which the U.S. has pursued, to various degrees for great
lengths of time for various reasons, since the 1700s are economic well-being,
and national security. Each of these interests helps maintain, and relies on to
a certain extent, a favorable world order [Ref. 41:p. 8].
a. Economic Interests
In the early and middle years of the Republic the overriding
basic interests of the new nation were economic in nature. This economic
view could be characterized by a realistic view of the world and an attitude of
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self-interest. The founding fathers knew that the young nation was weak and
they just wanted to pursue their own "minor" economic interests at the time.
This fact is brought out in Washington's farewell address in which he states,
"the nation which indulges toward another an habitual hatred or an habitual
fondness is in some degree a slave," and with Jefferson's idea of "no
entangling alliances" [Ref. 37:p.48]. Obviously this attitude reflects the
geographic isolation of the nation, its ideals of individualism, and the
prevailing anti-military attitude.
(1) Isolation. Geographically the U.S. was isolated from the
European powers, and all neighboring countries were relatively weak--both
economically and militarily. Working closely with these factors were the
Monroe Doctrine and parallel British economic interests. To be left alone to
expand seaborne commercial trade assets and to expand westward across the
continent were the goals of the "Eastern" and "Southern" interests. These
isolationist tendencies reinforced the basic national interest at the time--
laissez-faire economics.
(2) Individualism. In the United States the individual is
supreme. This individualism is part of American culture that also dates back
to the revolutionary period. Men like Thomas Jefferson stressed the rights of
the individual, and the Bill of Rights explicitly protects certain personal
rights. Yet this individualism dealt not only with personal issues, but also
corporate issues. By the 1800s America was expanding and industrializing,
with her spread out society caring more about wealth and individual freedom
than community. The limited liability company, or corporation, developed at
this time. Many states issued charters to individuals, which gave them the
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right to raise money through public sale of stock to build railways, and
telegraph and steamship lines [Ref. 37:p. 941. Americans were constantly
looking for markets throughout the world. The search for markets was
heavily concentrated in the Western Hemisphere, yet it was also pushed in
other world areas. China and the "open door" is a classic example of this. E.
H. Harriman used the open door in attempting to build a railroad in
Manchuria. These "individual" business ventures were usually backed up by
U.S. policy. Therefore, it seems fairly obvious that individualism was a
major part of the basic national interest of economics.
(3) Anti-Military. Throughout America's first 100 years the
military was typically kept small and played a fairly minor role. Historically,
Americans have distrusted the use of military force for the attainment of
national objectives [Ref. 42 :p. 381. The American people were not so much
anti-military, but rather, impatient and typically against paying the price in
men and money. As General George C. Marshall remarked, "a democracy
cannot fight a Seven Years War" [Ref. 43:p. 5]. Of course America did use
force during this period; the War of 1812, War with Mexico, Civil War, and
the Spanish-American War in 1898. These wars were not always brief, but
after each the army was reduced to a minor number. By 1820 the army was
being reduced from 10,000 to 6,000 men and the navy had a total of only seven
ships of the line [Ref. 43:p. 61]. During this period of American history, after
the Napoleonic Wars, Europe had a period of relative peace. This European
peace helped America maintain her peace. The "Pax Britannia" of the time
was very much a British economic imposed peace which coordinated well
with American interests--economic prosperity.
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It seems that economic well-being certainly had the highest
national interest priority for a substantial portion of U.S. history. "Dollar
Diplomacy" was important but the U.S. also had important world order
interests. These "international" interests may seem to go against
isolationism, individualism, and anti-military attitudes. But, in a realistic
world, world order interests help keep the international environment stable.
A stable world enhances the economic concerns of all involved. The U.S. has
typically tried to keep any one major power from getting to strong and thus
dominating world markets through military strength. This was done in
Europe, Latin America, and the Far East. This was also done to assure
hemispheric predominance for the U.S. in economic and military matters.
Maintaining a "balance of power" supported U.S. economic national interests
[Ref. 44:p. 61. This beginning portion of American history is unique, the
generation that gave us the constitution was the only generation in American
history that combined the nation's political leaders and its intellectual leaders
in the same people [Ref. 37:p. 39].
If December 7, 1941 is the major turning point for American
national interests, then the period between 1898 and 1941 was a transition
period. In the aftermath of the Spanish-American war the U.S. became an
Imperial power. And, though America remained neutral until 1917, she
eventually became involved in World War I. Also, the U.S. was technically
neutral in WW II until Dec. 1941, in reality though, she was far from not
involved. The was also the point in time when the "open door" policy began
to shift from an economic/commercial policy to more of a political/military
policy. American policy at the time has been called Wilsonian because of the
67
idealism and moralism of the time. But these ideas were quickly shattered by
WW II.
b. Defense Interests
Throughout World War II and the post war period the basic
national interests were pursued, but during this phase of American history
the military or defense portion received the greatest emphasis. The national
security interest was oriented toward the Soviet Union and Communism.
The goal was to stop the spread of communism and Soviet influence through
containment. There were many causal factors to solidify the shift in the
national interest: the communist coup in Czechoslovakia in 1948, fall of
Nationalist China in 1949, the Korean War, Hungary in 1956, the Berlin
Blockade, the Cuban Missile Crisis, Czechoslovakia again in 1968, Vietnam,
and Afghanistan. It is interesting to note that even after WW II and the
events of the late 1940s, the U.S. had initially demobilized to a point where by
the start of the Korean War there were only 10 understrength army and 2
understrength marine divisions [Ref. 43:p. 382]. Americans have historically
favored a small standing military, yet today the U.S. has a substantial military
and a $300 billion defense budg-et. The awesome defense investment has
certainly protected the U.S. from all military adversaries, and it has helped
maintain a fairly favorable world order so as to pursue other interests.
When the USSR failed to demobilize after WW II and with other problems
throughout the world, usually Soviet inspired, the U.S. maintained and even
increased its forward deployed troops throughout the world. Even with these
large forward deployed forces, U.S.-Soviet confrontation has been one of
politics rather than military force. Confrontation has typically taken place in
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the Third World with proxies or with nations supplied with arms by either
East or West bloc nations. The U.S. and the USSR have become involved in
Third World conflicts, but rarely directly against one another. Both have
been content to sell or supply arms to upset the other's political desires.
These arms have now become very sophisticated as has the multi-polar world
that uses them.
As the U.S. maintained national security and deterrence, with
respect to the USSR, as the primary national interest of over the years, its
benefits have usually been rewarding. Unfortunately the benefits may have
come at the expense of the U.S. national economy. Over the past decade or
two the economy has started to show cracks. Certainly the Reagan years
brought the "largest peacetime economic expansion" ever, but this was done
at the expense of others. These past indicators mask the true picture of a
weaker economy. The productive base of the U.S. economy--upon which our
standard of living ultimately rests--has been eroded by neglect and
underinvestment. The U.S. has lost large parts of its electronics, steel,
machine tool, auto, and computer industries to foreign competition. The
public sector of the U.S. economy--which is increasingly critical to competing
in today's world economy--has also been weakened by underinvestment.
Federal support for civilian research and development has been cut. As a
result, nearly 70 percent of federal R&D--and 30 percent of all R&D is now
devoted to defense. Cuts in federal spending have also hurt the quality of the
educational system, causing a large part of society to be functional illiterate
and incapable of working in an information based economy. Crime, murder,
and drug use are at all time highs; and many roads, bridges, and airports are
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in disrepair, and the U.S. is beginning to lag behind competitors in the
construction of a modern nationwide telecommunications network. [Ref.
45:p. 43] As the nation slides into a recession, these past deficiencies are
starting to come to light. When looking at Tables VI and VII, there are only
two areas where federal spending has gone up over the past twelve years--
defense spending and interest payments. Another interesting figure is the
non-defense discretionary spending. This figure has gone down to the
detriment of the U.S. industrial base. Clearly the U.S. spent more on defense
in the 1950s and 60s (overall percentage) but she also controlled 40 percent of
the world's GNP in 1949 [Ref. 46:p. 18].
It is not the point of this section to support the thesis of Paul
Kennedy and to say that America is about to fall. 45 The point to make is that
if the "cold war" is ending, it is appropriate for the U.S. to re-evaluate its
interests in the Third World, and decide if it is prepared to face the advanced
weapons that have proliferated to these nations. Would it be more
advantageous to once again adjust national interests to reflect the post 1989
world? The most obvious example of where to address this adjustment of
American national interests is in the Middle East. For Example, one option is
45See Paul Kennedy's book, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. An
excellent quote from the epilogue that conveys the overall theme is, "If Great
Powers neglect to provide adequate military defenses, they may be unable to
respond if a rival Power takes advantage of them; if they spend too much on
armaments--or, more usually, upon maintaining at growing cost the military
obligations they had assumed in a previous period--thtey are likely to
overstrain themselves.
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TABLE VI--OUTLAYS FOR MAJOR SPENDING
Year National Entitlements Nondefense Net Interest




1978 104.5 217.5 124.3 35.4
1980 134.0 278.2 156.6 52.5
1982 185.3 357.5 155.1 85.0
1984 227.4 394.8 165.7 111.1
1986 173.4 455.4 174.1 136.0
1988 290.3 501.2 175.7 151.7
Percent of Total Outlays
1978 22.8 47.4 27.1 7.7
1980 22.7 47.1 26.5 8.9
1982 24.8 47.9 20.8 11.4
1984 26.7 46.3 19.5 13.0
1986 27.6 46.0 17.6 13.7
1988 27.3 47.1 16.5 14.3
Percent of GNP
1978 4.8 10.0 5.7 1.6
1980 5.0 10.4 5.9 2.0
1982 5.9 11.4 4.9 2.7
1984 6.2 10.7 4.5 3.0
1986 6.5 10.9 4.2 3.2
1988 6.1 10.5 3.7 3.2
*Source [Ref. 47:pp. 33-361.
for the U.S. to work on locating and developing oil reserves, and other
economic resources, in its own hemisphere. The U.S. already pays billions on
military forces to patrol and protect gulf oil, and billions on foreign assistance
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to nations such as Israel, Egypt, and Pakistan to maintain regional stability.
And, these are pre-Desert Shield costs which add up to between $80.00 and
$600.00 a barrel depending on the source.46 If the U.S. did adjust its economic
and military interests to look closer to home, and develop these hemispheric
resources, the need to be involved throughout the Third World would be
reduced. But is this adjustment appropriate or possible? Before
recommending such a change, a more detailed assessment of U.S. national
interests in the Third World is needed.
TABLE VII-FEDERAL DEFICIT AND NET INTEREST PAYMENTS
Deficit Net Interest Payments
Year $billions $billions % change % of federal outlays
1980 -73.8 52.5 8.9
1981 -78.9 68.7 30.9 10.1
1982 -127.9 85.0 23.7 11.4
1983 -207.8 89.8 5.6 11.1
1984 -185.3 111.1 23.7 13.0
1985 -212.3 129.4 16.5 13.7
1986 -221.3 129.4 16.5 13.7
1987 -149.7 138.6 2.7 13.8
1988 -155.1 151.7 9.5 13.3
*Source [Ref. 47:pp. 33-361.
46Two articles on the "real" cost of Middle East oil are, "How to Break the
Middle East Oil Habit," by Richard Woodbury (Time, October 28, 1990), and
"The Real Cost of Mideast Oil," by Alan Tonelson and Andrew K. Hurd (The
New York Times).
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2. The Third World--A U.S. Vital Interest?
What should American national interests and priorities be in the
post cold war-new world era? With the USSR withdrawing from Europe,
dramatically restructuring their military intentions, if not their capabilities,
and abandoning many areas of the Third World, what should the American
response be?4 7 Some would say that without a Soviet threat the U.S. has no
security threat and therefore enormous defense cuts are warranted. Others
would argue that the threat has merely shifted from the USSR to the Third
World in an unbelievably short time. Proponents of each side of the
argument obviously have their own agendas. The key is to identify
American interests, if there are any, in these peripheral areas and decide if the
military has a role in protecting these interests. Is it in the U.S. national
interest to fight a war over Kuwait with Iraq? Is it in the U.S. national
interest to protect certain Third World nations from hegemonic regional
neighbors? Or, should the U.S. adjust its national interests to reflect a
changing world?
Using some general concepts and definitions from Nuechterlein's
national interest matrix, an attempt will be made to identify key national
interests, and to show where adjustments can be made. There are some areas
of the world, "key centers of industrial power," that will always be survival or
vital economic and military interests to the U.S. [Ref. 46:p. 101. These non-
47While the USSR may be pulling back, both financially and militarily,
from places such as Cuba, Vietnam and Afghanistan, they are still the largest
arms supplier to the Third World. And, there are still substantial numbers of
Soviet advisors training foreign military units in the use of these weapons--
Iraq is a current example.
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Third World countries are: Canada, Japan, and Western Europe. The only
obvious Third World nation that fits in this category would be Mexico, due to
geographic proximity. The importance of these nations is relative and it is
not suggested that the U.S. should forward deploy in these areas indefinitely.
In the rest of the Third World it is much more difficult to identify vital
interests, and these interests can change rapidly. What follows is a brief
review of what are commonly put forth as U.S. interests, with an assessment
of their importance in the post 1990 world.
a. Raw Materials
Few areas of the Third World have much intrinsic value to the
U.S., with the one possible exception being the Persian Gulf oil region. But
even this area is debatable. With oil being the possible exception, other
natural resources are not as crucial to the U.S. Alarmists often point to
alleged U.S. dependence on raw material from Third World nations. 4 8
According to this view, the U.S. economy requires access to a variety of critical
natural resources like cobalt, chromium, platinum, and manganese.
Therefore the U.S. must be prepared to intervene to preserve access to these
raw materials.
"Although the U.S. imports a large percentage of its annual
consumption of certain raw materials, it does so because foreign
suppliers are the least expensive, not because they are the only
alternative. The magnitude of a state's imports does not determine its
dependence on others; what is important is the cost of replacing existing
sources of supply or doing without them entirely. A lengthy embargo is
a remote possibility--why would a poor Third World country cut off a
48 For a complete work concerning U.S. dependence on Third World
resources and other U.S. interests in the Third World, see [Ref. 48].
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major source of revenue?--and the U.S. can rely upon alternative
suppliers, substitutes, and plentiful stockpiles." [Ref. 46 :p. 20]
b. Oil
With oil being the one possible exception with respect to vital
U.S. interests in the Third World, the region that immediatEly comes to mind
is the Persian Gulf. Of course if the President decides the Persian Gulf is vital,
as has been done recently, then the region is vital. Yet, certain points should
be brought out about this vital interest. It seems many events of the past
have been misunderstood. According to Robert H. Johnson writing in
International Security, there was no major oil shortage in 1973 and 1979 as
consequence of the actions of the oil producers. There was some temporary
reduction in world supplies, but the sharp price rije was mainly the
consequence of other factors. The price rise was mainly a unique adjustment
of prices to changed market realities, and was accelerated by a speculative
panic simulated by fears about future suppliers. The gasoline lines at
American service stations were the result of U.S. price controls and the effort
to manage distribution of supplies by bureaucratic allocation. There were no
such lines in other countr..s where allocation of reduced supplies was left to
the market. Both oil shocks, therefore, were less the consequence of
reduction in supply tha., of the impact of external events upon producer price
behavior or consumer expectations. [Ref. 49:p. 126) While this oil history is
somewhat disheartening, the outlook for the future could be brighter.
Although the U S now imports almost 50% of its oil needs, a smaller
percentage comes from the Middle East now than in the 1970s. Also, the U.S.
has substantial oil, natural gas, and coal :eserves of its own. (See Table VIII)
And, the U.S. now has a Strategic Petroleum Reserve of over 550 million
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barrels of oil. Oil is now even more fungible than before and the global
market is even larger, making it nearly impossible to deprive a country such
as the U.S. of oil. The Persian Gulf nations now have huge world wide assets
that can be frozen or seized in a crisis. These developments lessen the U.S.
vulnerability to oil interruptions. This is not meant to suggest that the U.S.
should be complacent. Rather, it suggests that a clear energy policy could
completely free the U.S. from a "vital" interest that is potentially unreliable.
c. Trade
TABLE VIII. ESTIMATED OIL, NATURAL GAS, AND COAL
Natural Gas (Trillions of Cubic Feet) Oil (Billions of Barrels)
USSR 1,500 Saudi Arabia 255.0
Iran 500 Iraq 100
Abu Dhabi 183 Kuwait 94.5
Saudi Arabia 181 Iran 92.8
U.S. 165 U.A.E. 92.2
Recoverable Coal Reserves (Million Venezuela 58.5
Tons (metric) Coal Equivalent
United States 166,950 USSR 58.4
Soviet Union 109,900 Mexico 56.4
China 98,883 U.S. 25.9
Poland 59,600 China 24.0
United Kingdom 45,000
*** The U.S. has enough natural gas to last 60 years at current consumption rates. The U.S.
total daily use of oil is approximately 17.2 million barrels per day.
*Source - [Ref. 501, Time magazine, September 24, 1990 and The Herald, September 16, 1990
Aside from raw materials and oil, other U.S. interests in the
Third World seem insignificant at this time, but do have the potential to
grow. The entire Third World produces less than 20 percent of the gross
world product and this is scattered over 100 countries. Foreign trade is only
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14 percent of U.S. GNP, and nearly two-thirds of all trade is with the
industrial world. The entire Third World trade (including OPEC) is only 3.5
percent of U.S. GNP, though trade with the Third World provides over one-
third of U.S. imports and exports. [Ref. 46:p. 191 Of course most of these
figures are growing and will probably continue to grow. Regional nations
such as ASEAN have had impressive growth rates and their interaction with
the U.S. will expand.
d. Geopolitics
There is another issue that must be addressed when considering
the importance of Third World nations in relation to the U.S. national
interest; geopolitics and the loss of control of important waterways and land
masses. Yet, if one believes the initial conditions set forth, a diminished
Soviet threat, then the major portion of this problem is actually non-existent.
A second consideration when considering this problem would be loss of
control of a strategic area to a Third Wo.ld power. Few Third World nations,
at this time, have the capability to effect events in these areas, though the
number is growing with the proliferation of advanced weapons. The
problem actually becomes one of economics. Since the U.S. has few items of
strategic value that actually pass through these areas, as shown earlier, then
the areas themselves lose value. Certainly there are areas of strategic value,
the Caribbean basin is an example, but the overall, geo-political value is less
than commonly thought.
e. World Order
The final national interest with debatable value for the U.S. is
political-ideological interests. Steven R. David writing in International
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Securitu advocates--"Promoting American values in the Third World is and
should remain a critical component of U.S. policy. It is important for the U.S.
to promote freedom and democracy in the Third World because Americans
believe this to be the best way of life. Extending American values enhances
American interests." [Ref. 48:p. 81] Certainly a nation with American,
democratic, or capitalistic values will enhance U.S. interests. But, this can
lead to policy behavior that is hypocritical. Promoting and spreading
freedom and democracy looks good in the abstract. Yet, since when are the
Emir of Kuwait, the King of Saudi Arabia, and their respective governments
free and democratic? A more realistic approach is for the U.S. to support a
stable world order while making subtle inroads to more extreme nations.
With the USSR bankrupt, and communist ideology totally discredited, the
Soviet-U.S. zero sum game is over. The U.S. no longer has to support
extreme regimes in order to offset the USSR. There are tremendous
opportunities for the U.S. to promote democratic values, but the key is to be
straightforward, not hypocritical.
Once again, the intention here is not to advocate Paul Kennedy's
thesis or the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces throughout the world.
Rather, it is to identify vital U.S. national interests and to see if they can be
adjusted without answering to a special interest agenda. There are clear
threats to the U.S. national interest in the Third World, and the U.S. should
pursue a policy that will protect these interests. When important, or legal
treaty bound allies and friends are faced with threats to their political,
economic, or social stability, the U.S. should act to stabilize the region with
economic or political help. Military power should be used as a last resort due
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to its implications, and because the reasons behind Third World conflicts are
typically very complicated. Clear threats to the U.S. include the following:
illegal drugs both the consumption and trafficking, terrorism against
American interests and people, immigration/population explosions,
pollution and disease control, world debt, and the proliferation of military
capability with negative consequences for U.S. security. Increased
interdependence with the Third World and the increasing gap between th2
"haves" and "have nots" may in the future effect the availability of raw
materials for American allies, which may effect the U.S. national interest.
This could only happen if the Third World organizes itself in some effective
form, and only if the U.S. considers the "health" of its allies a national
interest.
Whether or not the the U.S. has national interests in the Third
World is dependent on numerous variables. The president, congress, special
interests, and the American public all have an input, but the president must
make the final decision. What Americans must hope for is a clear headed,
truthful presentation and appraisal of the facts upon which a decision should
then be based. If the U.S. is unwilling to "pay the price" in lives and money
to "rollback" or preemptively take out threatening air defense weapons, and if
these weapons transfers cannot be limited or controlled, there is only one
option left--adjust interests. With the information presented, it seems U.S.
national interests in the Third World could be adjusted to reflect the new
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international system. 49 Without these adjustments, the U.S. will slip into the
role of being the world's policeman, a role that is doomed to decline in the
face of international economic, political, and military realities.
41
49Attempting to address the numerous adjustments that could be made to
American interests in the Third World is beyond the scope of this thesis. The
purpose, rather, is to show that there is an air defense weapons transfer
prob'.em in the Third World, and that a good policy option to address this
problem is adjusting national interests. The current interests that the United
States has with respect to the Third World do not have a foundation in pre-
Cold War historical analysis.
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VI. IS THE U.S. WILLING TO OVERCOME THE PROBLEMS CREATED BY
AIR DEFENSE WEAPONS PROLIFERATION IN THE THIRD WORLD?
Unfortunately, in this writer's opinion, many American interests in the
Third World are based on shaky foundations and a lack of understanding of
what America's interests really should be. And, the proliferation of advanced
air defense weapons is not going to disappear anytime soon. But this opinion
will not change American policy, therefore, a question must be asked. Is the
U.S. willing to overcome the problems associated with the proliferation of
advanced weapons when protecting Third World interests?
A. STRUCTURE OF THE NAVY--CAN THE FLEET HANDLE THE JOB?
Today's U.S. Navy has been planned and built with the Soviet Union in
mind as the greatest threat. The Reagan administration used the threat of
Soviet armed forces to help drive the U.S. Navy force level to 600 ships, 15
carrier battle groups, and 4 battleship surface action groups. This build up was
done under the auspices of a NATO conflict and to support the "Maritime
Strategy". It is debatable as to whether or not this was the correct force mix to
battle the USSR and obviously defense cuts are going to affect numbers of
ships. But, a mix of carriers, surface ships, and submarines will still be vital
for protecting whatever Third World interests the President deems
important. In my view the general structure of the navy built to face the
USSR will be effective in regional conflicts.
The carrier should continue to be the center piece of naval operations.
Due to its flexibility in all facets of naval warfare, amphibious warfare, and
land attack, the carrier is the weapon for Third World conflict. It seems that
as the number of carriers is reduced to the generally accepted number of
twelve, naval commitments must also be reduced. 50  Past naval
commitments were generated with the USSR in mind, and have been self
imposed. The U.S. currently has few "hard" commitments for the
deployment of naval forces [Ref. 52:p. 36]. With reduced Europzan
commitments, Third World interests can easily be covered with twelve
carriers. Considering eight of these twelve carriers will be Nimitz class, and if
modernization of aircraft (A-12, NATF, ATSA) continues, most Third World
commitments will be manageable for the foreseeable future. To increase the
strike/attack capability of these twelve carriers, the typical airwing must be
reorganized to accommodate more medium attack aircraft. This plan was put
forth in the mid-1980s and needs to be carried through [Ref. 11:p. 375]. Force
reductions will also effect the surface and subsurface communities. To adjust
for the loss in numbers, the navy will have to increase capability and
technology in these units. The navy will no longer be able to afford a
high/low mix of surface ships, nor can it afford 100 attack submarines. A
middle ground must be found so that surface ships can continue to work with
the carriers, convoy escort, interdict drugs, escort oil tankers, and work
independently. Submarines must still be able to handle the Soviet threat, as
well the 250 submarines spread out among Third World nations [Ref. 53:p.
401. Exact numbers of surface and subsurface units are beyond the scope of
5
°As reported by Michael Gordon in the New York Times, August 2, 1990,
the Navy portion of the new national strategy will rely on 12 carriers and
reduced commitments [Ref. 51:p. 12].
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this paper, but reduced numbers with increased capability are needed with the
reduced defense budget.
With the savings produced through reduced numbers, the navy must
then emphasize logistics/sustainability and modernization. With the
prospect of the U.S. continuing to withdraw from many of its forward bases,
logistics and sustainability are vital. The Marine Corps will continue to be the
"tip of the U.S. spear," and their amphibious assault capability must be
sustainable. As the current Middle East crisis has shown, U.S. sealift
capability is straining under the massive buildup. 51 Even though Light
Divisions are in vogue, as this current crisis shows, Heavy Divisions are still
needed. Luckily this current crisis is not a European scenario. Fast sealift,
shipbuilding, and the merchant marine are investments for the future.
ModernLation is also a key ingredient for future success. As the implications
section has shown, proliferation of advanced weapons systems will wreak
havoc on all naval missions unless the U.S. navy can maintain the edge with
technology. Marines, surface ships, and aircraft will all be meeting their
equals in the very near future if aircraft like the A-12 are not developed and
produced.
Many opponents of current naval force structure argue that large ships
are very vulnerable to anti ship missiles. This may certainly be true with
respect to the USSR, but this is not true with respect to Third World yet. Very
few nations of the world have the capability or the numbers to overwhelm
5 See "Supply Line," by John Burlage and David S. Steigman (Naviy
Times, December 3, 1990) for an insight into logistics and sustainability.
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current navy defenses when they are committed to operating in a known
hostile environment. Certainly the numbers and capability of these nations is
increasing, but with continued modernization the U.S. Navy can still to hold
an edge.
B. IS THE U.S. WILLING TO PAY THE PRICE TO PREVAIL IN THIRD
WORLD CONFLICT?
There is no easy answer to this question. The American public gets very
excited and very supportive when the navy shoots down Libyan MIGs, but
the support goes away when hundreds of marines die in Lebanon. But the
American people are not to blame, as this reflects American heritage and
history. Like it or not Americans are happy when they are winning and
nobody is dying, but with a zero-loss attitude it is difficult to sustain a long
commitment when reasons are ambiguous or ridiculous. Even during a
fairly clear case of self preservation, World War II, there was a substantial
anti-war movement. And immediately after the war, American demobilized.
To harness the national will, the commitment of the people is needed.
For the people to commit they must be told the truth and the reasons why a
particular policy relates to an American interest. Without clear and
reasonable objectives, the people's commitment will be tentative at best. To
compare Saddam Hussein to Hitler is ridiculous and only will sell for a short
time. "Blatant aggression" like Saddam's occurs throughout the world
regularly and the U.S. does not send 200,000 troops every time it happens.
The public now believes the real battle is oil, and oil for blood will not sell in
the long term. VW.'hatever the reasons, the President must be straightforward
and candid in order to get the people's support. Some may think this
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commitment problem was brought on by the Vietnam experience. But in
reality,
"Vietnam was a reaffirmation of the peculiar relationship between the
American Army and the American people. The American Army really
is a people's Army in the sense that it belongs to the American people
who take a jealous and proprietary interest in its involvement. When
the Army is committed the American people are committed, when the
American people lose their commitment it is futile to try to keep the
Army committed. In the final analysis, the American Army is not so
much an arm of the Executive Branch as it is an arm of the American
people. The Army, therefore, cannot be committed lightly." [Ref. 54:p.
11]
C SUMMARY
As air defense weapons proliferate throughout the world, and as the
world becomes more multi-polar and interdependent, U.S. national interests
must be adjusted to reflect this change. U.S. interests cannot be dominated by
whatever burning issue threatens the contemporary scene. Before this can
happen, clear unbiased arguments must be put forth. Once the national
interest is identified, the navy and other military forces must be structured so
as to protect these interests. Hopefully these interests will not involve
making the U.S. the world guardian of stability. It must also be remembered
that military force is not always the answer. As Patrick J. Buchanan has said,
"There are lots of things worth fighting for, but an extra 10 cents for a gallon
of gas isn't one of them." [Ref. 55:p. 27] The U.S. is now deeply involved in
Saudi Arabia and the price of a barrel of crude oil has gone from $18 to over
$40 a barrel at times, and the U.S. has not fired a shot. What happens if a war
does start? What would have happened if the U.S. had not gotten militarily
involved? Would the price of oil be as h gh? It is not worth American lives
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when the interests are not clear. With proliferation the cost in lives is going
to go up drastically and Americans will not be willing to pay the price.
As history shows, the basic interest of economic well-being has typically been
at the forefront of U.S. national interests. National security has also been an
important national interest for a substantial part of American history. Yet as
a result of an overemphasis on defense, America has recently shown signs of
being overextended. With the world changing, the U.S. must adjust her
national interests to reflect this change. A middle ground needs to be found
so that the U.S. can protect its economic interests with a smaller, yet viable
military. This must be done while keeping in mind that world order is
important to both economic and military interests. World order must be
approached with an honest, open minded appruach that reflects the changes
mentioned.
When the national interest is finally decided upon, it does need to be
protected. Currently the U.S. Navy is the service most able to respond in the
shortest time frame, with the most sustainability, and with the largest punch
for the dollar. With respect to the Third World, the navy is in the best
position to handle almost any contingency.
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APPENDIX A. EXPORT AIRCRAFT CAPABILITIES
MIG-29-USSR
Armament Six medium range radar homing AA-10 and/or close range
AA-11. Provisions for carrying AA-9 and AA-8 missiles.
Able to carry bombs and 57 mm gun, 80 mm and 240 mm
rockets in attack role. One 30 mm gun inport wingroot.
Doppler engagement radar, IR sensor, laser rangefinder, 360
degree radar warning system, head-up display, and helmet
mounted aiming device.
Performance Max level speed: at height Mach 2.3, at S/L Mach 1.06. Max
rate of climb at S/L 65,000 ft/min. Service ceiling 56,000 ft.
Max range 1,300 miles.
Tornado ADV--Panavia
Armament One 27 mm cannon starboard side forward fuselage. Two
AIM-9L Sidewinder. Four Sky Flash MRAAM, and in the
future, up to six AIM-20 AMRAAM, and four ASRAAM.
Performance Max level speed: At height Mach 2.2. Service ceiling 70,000
ft. Intercept radius - supersonic 345 miles, subsonic 1,151
miles.
F-16--USA
Armament One 20 mm multi-barrel cannon in the port side wing/body
fairing. Up to six AIM-9J/L sidewinders or AMRAAM. Can
carry gun, rockets, conventional bombs, special weapons,
laser guided and electro-optical weapons in the air to
ground role.
Performance Max level speed at 40,000 ft, above Mach 2.0. Service ceiling
50,000 ft. Radius of action 575 miles. Ferry range 2,415 miles.
F-15--USA
Armament Provisions for four AIM-9L/M, four AIM-7F/M or eight
AMRAAM, and a 20 mm six barrel gun. Up to 23,600 lb of
bombs and rockets for air to surface role.
Performance Max level speed more than Mach 2.5. Service ceiling 60,000
ft. Ferry range with CFTs 3570 miles.
F-18--USA
Armament One 20 mm Vulcan cannon. Two AIM-9 sidewinders plus
four AIM-7 sparrows in the fighter role. Or two AIM-9s plus
17,000 lbs of bombs, missiles, and rockets in attack role.
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Performance Max Mach 1.8+ at 40,000 ft. Service ceiling 50,000 ft. Radius
in fighter role is 415 nautical miles, and 550 nautical miles
in attack role. Ferry range is 2000 nautical miles.
Mirage 2000-France
Armament Two 30 mm guns. Two Matra Super 530D or 530F missiles,
and two Matra 550 Magic or Magic 2 missiles. Up to 13,890
lbs of external stores in the air to surface role.
Performance Max level speed over Mach 2.2. Max rate of climb at S/L
56,000 ft/min. Service ceiling 59,000 ft. Range with four 250
kg bombs over 920 miles, with three drop tanks 2,073 miles.
* Source [Ref. 8]
*Source [Ref. 8]
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APPENDIX B. EXPORT SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE CAPABILITIES
Crotale--France
Type: Land based point defense tactical SAM
Dimensions: diameter 5.9 in; length 9.48 ft; span 21.25 in
Weights: total round 187.4 lb; warhead 30.64 lb BAe infra-red proximity-
fused focalized FRAG-HE
Propulsion: solid propellant rocket
Performance: speed Mach 2.3; range 545/14,215 yards; altitude limits 50/16,405
ft.
Guidance: radar command with infra-red/radar gathering and tracking
Shahine--France
Type: land and ship based point defense tactical SAM
Dimensions: diameter 6.14 in; length 10.33 ft; span 23.23 in
Weights: total round 231.5 lb; warhead 30.9 lb infra-red proximity and
impact fused focalized FRAG-HE
Propulsion: One dual thrust solid propellent rocket
Performance: speed Mach 2.5; range 545/15,310 yards; altitude 50/22,310 ft
Guidance: radar command with infra-red/radar gathering and tracking
Roland--Euromissile
Type: land based point defense tactical SAM
Dimensions: diameter 6.3 in; length 7.87 ft; span 19.7 in
Weights: total round 146.6 lb; warhead 14.3 TRT radar proximity and
impact fused FRAG-HE
Propulsion: One solid propellant booster rocket and one solid propellant
sustainer rocket
Performance: speed Mach 1.6; range 545/6890 yards; altitude; 65/18045 ft
Guidance: IR gathering then optical or radar semi-automatic radar
command to line of sight
Javelin--UK
Type: man portable point defense tactical SAM
Dimensions: diameter 3.0 in; length 4.59 ft; span 10.9 ft
Weights: missile 33.8 lb; warhead proximity and impact fused FRAGHE
Propulsion: on,: two stage solid propellant rocket
Performance: speed Mach 1.5; range 325/6,000 yards; altitude 0/6,500 ft
Guidance: semi automatic command to line of sight
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Rapier--UK
Type: land based point defense tactical SAM
Dimensi,-,rs: diameter 5.25 in; length 7.35 ft; span 15.0 in
Weights: total round 94 lb; warhead 3.1 lb impact fused semi armor
piercing HE
Propulsion: one solid propellant dual thrust rocket
Performance: speed Mach 2+; range 270/7,500 yards; altitude limits 0/10,000 ft
Gidance: optical semi automatic command to line of sight
SA-13--USSR
Type: land based point tactical SAM
Dimensions: diameter 4.72 in; length 7.22 ft; span 15.75 in
Weights: total round 121 lu; warhead 8.8 lb irpact and proximity fused
FRAG-HE
Propulsion: one solid propellant rocket
Performance: speed Mach 2; range 550/10935 yards; altitude limits 33/32,810 ft
Guidance: IR homing
SA-14--USSR
Type: man portable point defense tactical SAM
Dimensions: diameter 2.95 in; length 4.625 ft; span unknown
Weights: total round 21.285 lb warhead proximity fused FRAG-HE
Propulsion: one solid propellant rocket
Performance: supersonic; range 655/6,650 yards; altitude 33/18,045
Guidance: IR homing
I-HAWK--USA
Type: land based medium range area defense tactical SAM
Dimensions: diameter 14.0 in; length 16.79 ft; span 4.0 ft
Weights: total round 1383 lb; warhead 120+ lb proximity fused FRAG-HE
Propulsion: one dual thrust solid propellant rocket
Performance: speed Mach 2.5; range 25 miles; altitude 100/49,000 ft
Guidance: semi active radar homing
Stinger--USA
Type: man portable point defense tactical SAM
Dimensions: diameter 2.75 in; length 5.0 ft; span 3.6 in
Weights: total round 22.3 lb; warhead 6.6 lb proximity fused FRAG-HE
Propulsion: one dual thrust solid propellant rocket
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Perform~ance: speed Mach 2+; range 5,500 yards; altitude 15,750 ft
Guidance: IR homing
* source [Ref. 7] and [Ref. 91
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APPEND..' C. SELECTED THIRD WORLD REGIONS-COMBAT AIRCRAFT
RADII
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